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ABSTRACT
Essays on Newspaper Economics
by
Adithya Pattabhiramaiah
This dissertation consists of two chapters that focus on estimating the economic impact of two
major pricing changes witnessed recently in the U.S. newspaper industry. The first chapter
investigates the optimality of the decision adopted by print newspaper publishers to increase
subscription prices notwithstanding a declining preference among readers for newspaper
consumption. Further, it proposes and evaluates theoretical explanations for the increasing
subscription price trajectory in this market. Of the three available subscription options in
print (Daily, Weekend and Sunday only), subscription prices increased more steeply for the
Daily option; this is consistent with the view that newspapers are driving away low valuation
Daily option readers but not Sunday, as Sunday contributes higher ad revenues. As an
extreme case of this strategy, several newspapers have adopted a policy change by limiting
production/distribution of the newspaper only to weekends. A counterfactual simulation
shows the implications of such a policy change and offers implications for effective newspaper
product portfolio management. Second, over the last few years, another popular strategy
xii
among newspaper publishers operating online editions is the creation of paywalls (i.e., the
practice of charging online readers a subscription fee for accessing news content). News
publishers’ objectives from setting up paywalls are believed to be threefold: a) creating a
new revenue stream by monetizing online news content in the reader market, b) preserving
the more lucrative print subscription revenues by discouraging print readers from switching
to free online newspapers, and c) increasing the newspaper’s ability to charge higher ad
rates by promoting a subscription base of paying readers. It is unclear whether charging
readers for online access will unambiguously serve all the expected objectives especially since
the paywalls run the risk of leading to heavy attrition of readers and hence, advertisers.
The second chapter employs readership and advertising data for the New York Times, a
newspaper that has been cited in the media for its successful paywall execution, to investigate
the effects of its paywall launch on online readership, print circulation and online advertising
revenues.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Rising Prices under Declining Preferences: The case of
the U.S. Print Newspaper Industry
1.2 Abstract
Between 2006 and 2011, daily print newspapers in the U.S. lost 20% of their paid subscribers,
partly due to the increasing availability of alternative sources of news, especially free content
provided on newspaper websites and by news aggregators such as Yahoo. However, contrary
to the expectation that firms respond to softening demand by lowering prices, newspapers
increased subscription prices by 40-60% during this period. These increasing prices might
accelerate the decline in circulation, in turn adversely affecting advertising revenue, which
has typically contributed 80% of newspaper revenues. We ask two questions in this pa-
per - Is the newspaper industry’s decision to increase subscription prices indeed optimal?
What factors explain the price increases? To answer these questions, we calibrate models of
readership and advertising demand using data from a top-50 U.S. regional print newspaper.
Conditional on these demand models, we comment on whether the increase in subscription
prices and the concomitant decrease in ad rates are mainly rationalized by: a) the news-
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paper’s strategic decision to drive away low willingness to pay readers or b) its reduced
incentive to subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers, due to softening demand for
newspaper advertising. We find that the optimal subscription price trajectory conditional
on the estimated readership and advertising demand models is increasing, consistent with
the pattern in the observed data. Furthermore, the decline in the ability of the newspaper
to subsidize readers by extracting surplus from advertisers is the primary reason why sub-
scription prices increase, suggesting that newspapers are moving towards a more balanced
revenue model with readership revenues contributing a higher proportion of total revenues.
Of the three available subscription options (Daily, Weekend and Sunday only), subscription
prices increased more steeply for the Daily option; this is consistent with the view that the
newspaper is driving away low valuation Daily option readers but not Sunday, as Sunday
contributes higher ad revenues. As an extreme case of this strategy, several newspapers are
limiting production/distribution of the newspaper only to the weekends. We perform a coun-
terfactual simulation based on our model estimates to study the implications of such a policy
change and thus offer implications for effective newspaper product portfolio management.
1.3 Introduction
The U.S. newspaper industry is facing unprecedented challenges due to dramatic losses in
revenue and profitability. As a result of the increasing availability of free news content
through newspaper websites and news aggregators such as Yahoo, readers are increasingly
less willing to pay for the print newspaper (Fallows, 2010; George, 2008). Most U.S. news-
paper publishers have responded by increasing subscription prices by 40-60% during this
2
period.1 With increasing competition, it is typically optimal to lower prices. The rationale
is that declining willingness to pay (WTP) and the associated higher price elasticity render
it optimal to lower prices (Tirole, 2007). Furthermore, as two-sided platforms, newspapers
derive their revenue from both readers and advertisers, with traditionally 80% coming from
the latter. Since ad revenue is tied to readership, the concern is that raising prices might
accelerate the decline in print circulation and lead to further erosion in advertising revenues.2
Thus, it might be important to preserve the readership base by lowering subscription prices.
A common explanation for increasing prices under declining overall WTP is that firms
strategically set prices to exploit differences in WTP among consumers (Hauser and Shugan,
1983); while newspapers served a broader group of readers in the past, decline in the overall
WTP for the print newspaper might have rendered readers with lower WTP less profitable
to serve. Consequently, the higher margins realized by catering only to high WTP readers
might offset any loss in profits from not serving the low value readers. This explanation is
consistent with the views of industry experts (e.g., Weber and Poyar, 2012; Filloux, 2012)
that newspapers should stabilize circulation revenues by catering to a smaller but more loyal
readership base.
We advance a second rationale that is heretofore under-investigated. Specifically, we
argue that the optimality of increasing prices is based on the two-sided nature of the news-
paper industry. Since advertisers value access to readers more than readers value newspaper
advertising, newspapers have historically subsidized readers and extracted premium prices
from advertisers (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Gabszewicz et al., 2005; Parker and Van Alstyne,
1As we discuss subsequently, the approximately 5% increase in marginal costs cannot explain the 40-
60% increase in subscription prices during this period. Also, commonly used quality metrics (Berry and
Waldfogel, 2010) such as the size of the newsroom and the average number of newspages have declined over
time. Therefore, increase in quality cannot explain the price increases either.
2Report “Circulation Pricing” dt. Mar 17, 2009 retrieved from the NAA’s website: www.naa.org.
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2005). However, the advent of alternative media options such as search advertising has made
print newspapers less attractive to advertisers. Thus, the waning preference among adver-
tisers for print newspaper advertising might have lowered the incentive to subsidize readers
at the expense of advertisers.3
In this paper, we investigate whether it is optimal for newspapers to increase subscription
prices, especially given that there are theoretical arguments both in favor of and against such
price increases. Further, if the price increases are indeed optimal as observed, we aim to
empirically study the extent to which reader heterogeneity and lower incentive to subsidize
readers with ad revenues, drives this pattern. By doing so, we examine claims in highly-
publicized industry reports (Weber and Poyar, 2012; Filloux, 2012) that newspapers’ price-
based segmentation strategies are primarily responsible for the steep increase in subscription
prices. Furthermore, equipped with data on demand for the newspaper on different days of
the week, we offer some key insights into newspapers’ effective product portfolio management
strategies, especially pertaining to managing readership on different days of the week.
We use unique data from a top-50 regional U.S. newspaper that serves a large metropoli-
tan area. Our data span 72 months, from January 2006 through December 2011, and contain
the following key information:
1. Monthly print subscriptions and prices for the three most popular options: Daily,
Weekend, and Sunday only, corresponding to print newspaper subscription on all seven
days, Fri/Sat/Sun, and Sunday respectively, broken down geographically by the sub-
3A third explanation is that when newspapers increase print subscription prices, they also consider the
consequent migration of print readers to the online newspaper. For newspapers, such as ours, that do not
operate newspaper paywalls, the migration of readers can bring in additional online advertising revenue
even if these online readers do not directly generate subscription revenues. Subsequently we discuss this
alternative explanation (in section 1.8.4.1) and show that this explanaton does not have a big influence on
print subscription prices.
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markets (counties) served by the newspaper. Access to sub-market and bundle-level
subscription data enables us to characterize the readership demand model and identify
heterogeneity in readers’ willingness to pay for the newspaper. The bundle level data
also help us account for reader substitution across bundles and allow us to study
differences in pricing implications for each bundle.
2. Monthly data on print advertising revenues and ad rates on the three types of adver-
tising, displays, inserts, and classifieds, to inform a model of advertiser demand. These
data help us characterize how the demand for each type of advertising changes with
ad rates and readership. In addition, access to data spanning several years enables us
to allow the advertising demand to vary from year to year as a result of exogenous
changes in competition in the advertising market.
To answer our research questions, we propose a model that describes the behavior of
three agents: readers, advertisers, and the newspaper. Readers choose between one of the
three available subscription bundles or the outside option of not subscribing to the print
newspaper. Advertisers choose the amount of advertising to place in the three possible
advertising types. Conditional on readership and advertising demand, the newspaper sets
subscription prices for readers for the three bundles and ad rates for each advertising type.
We estimate the readership and advertising models using GMM while accounting for the
simultaneity of the decisions made by readers, advertisers, and the newspaper by employing
appropriate exclusion restrictions. Conditional on the estimated readership and advertising
demand model parameters, we trace the temporal trajectories of the newspaper firm’s optimal
price-cost margins for readers and advertisers, and compare them with the observed path.
If the optimal subscription price is indeed increasing as observed, we can assess the extent
5
to which the two competing explanations drive print subscription prices upwards.
Based on our calibration of the readership demand model, we recover two distinct seg-
ments - a small segment consisting of about 8.5% of households in the market (33% of
subscribing households) with high WTP for newspaper subscription. We find that the per-
centage of high WTP subscribers increases over time as the low WTP readers quit subscrib-
ing. Moreover, there are significant differences in the proportion of high WTP subscribers
across the three subscription options; the daily bundle draws a disproportionately high num-
ber of high WTP readers. More importantly, these subscription options (bundles) also differ
in terms of the extent to which they lose the low WTP subscribers over time; options that
provide access to the newspaper only during the weekends tend to lose a lower proportion
of low WTP readers than the daily subscription option. Estimates from our advertising
model point to a declining intrinsic attractiveness among advertisers for print newspaper
advertising. This pattern suggests a declining incentive for newspapers to subsidize readers
at the expense of advertisers.
Based on our estimates from the readership and advertising demand models, we find
that the optimal subscription prices for all options ought to have increased, while the ad
rates ought to have decreased during the period of our analysis. In our data, subcription
prices increased for all subscription alternatives, while advertising rates corresponding to
each ad type decreased over our analysis duration. Therefore, the observed trajectories of
subscription and advertising prices are consistent with the optimal prices suggested by our
empirical analysis. Next, the commonly suspected reader heterogeneity in WTP argument
only explains a small fraction of the increase in subscription prices. On the other hand, 80%
of this increase can be traced back to a declining incentive to subsidize readers at the expense
of advertisers due to an exogenous year-on-year drop in advertising demand due to dynamics
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in the competitive environment (i.e., after accounting for the ad rates and readership).
We also find that in the absence of exogenous changes in advertising demand, the
subscription prices should have increased only for the daily subscription option, but not
for the weekend-only subscription options. This suggests that the newspaper ought to be
using steeper price increases to induce low WTP readers to switch away from weekday
subscription, while preserving readership on weekends, a pattern that is also consistent with
the data. We argue that, with shrinking advertising, the daily subscription option is unable
to generate significantly more revenue per reader than the Sunday-only option in order to
justify the higher cost of printing and distributing the newspaper on six additional days
each week. This is consistent with the high production/distribution costs facing the print
newspaper industry, as stated in popular press reports, which also suggest that newspapers
are actively restructuring their product portfolio decisions (Lendon, 2008; Carmichael, 2010).
Specifically, many newspapers have adopted an extreme case of this strategy by limiting
production/distribution of the newspaper only to the weekends. We perform a counterfactual
simulation based on our model estimates to study the implications of such a policy change
for the newspaper.
Overall, our findings provide key insights into the functioning of newspapers. When
the traditional newspaper model was to maintain a large readership base, it made sense
to keep subscription prices relatively low, while charging advertisers premium prices for
access to readers. However, after facing years of declining circulation, it is optimal for print
newspapers to move towards a more balanced subscription-cum-advertiser funded model.4
A premium pricing strategy aimed at charging loyal readers higher prices is possibly the
4Print newspaper circulation has recently encountered an all time low. The last time newspaper circulation
was at current levels was in the mid-1940s, when the population of the U.S. was half its current size - see
http://www.journalism.org/node/1414.
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way of the future for newspapers;5 this is especially true in times of declining advertising.
From a theoretical perspective, we find that price increases in two-sided markets could stem
from the platform’s need to balance revenues from both sides of the market, as opposed to
heterogeneity in WTP (the commonly advanced argument in one-sided market situations).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1.4, we briefly provide a conceptual
background to our research question. Section 1.5 describes the data used in the estimation
and provides descriptive evidence as a motivation for our research question. In section 1.6, we
discuss details of our proposed model. Section 1.7 discusses identification and the estimation
strategy. Results from the model, robustness checks and related counterfactual simulations
are presented in section 1.8, and section 1.9 concludes.
1.4 Conceptual Background
Our research is related to two emerging streams of literature: (a) work studying the impact
of consumer heterogeneity on firms’ pricing decisions and (b) pricing in two-sided markets.
Our first explanation for the observed price increase is the commonly advanced one, i.e.,
due to heterogeneity among readers in terms of their WTP. In this regard, our research is
related to papers that have investigated the role of consumer heterogeneity on the trajectory
of optimal prices. In contexts where customers exit the market subsequent to making a
purchase, the trajectory of optimal prices can either increase or decrease over time based on
whether high WTP consumers have an incentive to purchase early or late. In the context of
video games and game consoles wherein high WTP consumers tend to purchase early, Nair
5http://www.thedrum.com/news/2011/09/19/guardianrsquos-editor-chief-robustly-justifies-his-
newspaperrsquos-latest-cover
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(2007) and Liu (2010) argue that firms face a shrinking market and a remaining pool of low
WTP buyers over time. As a result, firms employ inter-temporal price discrimination by
initially charging premium prices to high WTP customers and reduce prices subsequently to
serve the low WTP consumers. In contrast, in his investigation of airline ticket purchases,
Lazarev (2013) documents that high WTP business travelers tend to purchase their tickets
later in order to reduce the uncertainty around their travel. In such a scenario, airlines find
it optimal to increase prices over time.
In settings where customers make repeat purchases, the optimal price trajectory would
respond to the changing composition of customers, possibly due to the entry of new alterna-
tives. For example, Frank and Salkever (1997) and Ching (2010) show that prices of branded
pharmaceutical drugs can increase when generics enter, although consumers are, on average,
less willing to pay premium prices for branded drugs. They argue that with the entry of
generics, price sensitive customers switch to cheaper generics. As a result, branded drugs
serve only the high WTP consumers, which renders it optimal to increase prices subsequent
to the entry of generics. Hauser and Shugan (1983) offer a similar rationale for why it might
be optimal to increase prices in response to competitive entry. Our context bears resem-
blence to this line of reasoning: the decline in the overall WTP for the print newspaper,
possibly due to the availability of alternative sources of news, might have rendered it less
profitable to serve low WTP readers. Consequently, the higher margins realized by catering
only to readers who are willing to pay more for the newspaper offsets any loss in profits from
not serving the low value readers.
We draw our second explanation for increasing subscription prices from the literature
on two-sided markets. Since newspapers derive their revenues from two sources, i.e., readers
and advertisers, with at least one side valuing the presence of the other, they operate in
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two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). An implication of two-sidedness is that the
markup on one side will depend on the elasticity of the response on both sides of the market
and the markup charged to the other side (Rysman, 2004; Kaiser and Wright, 2006; Wilbur,
2008; Song, 2012; Fan, 2013). As a result, theoretical work in the area of two-sided markets
(Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet and Tirole, 2003) predicts that the prices on one
side (e.g., reader) may be subsidized at the expense of the other side (e.g., advertiser).
An implication of this cross-subsidy rationale is that a change in the demand charac-
teristics on one side of the market can trigger a change in the optimal price charged on both
sides of the market. In the context of newspapers, researchers (e.g., Sridhar and Sriram,
2013) have documented that the growth in media options such as search advertising has
resulted in advertisers substituting away from the print newspaper, which, in turn, could
have rendered it optimal for the newspaper to increase subscription prices. In fact, Angelucci
et al. (2013) and Seamans and Zhu (2013) empirically document that an exogenous negative
shock to newspaper advertising results in higher prices to readers. However, they do not
discuss the optimality nor systematically explain the drivers of such price increases. Our
objective, on the other hand, is to investigate the optimality of price increases, as well as
discuss implications for newspaper product portfolio management.
Furthermore, since we consider multiple explanations for the price increase, we seek to
infer the extent to which reader heterogeneity vs. decreasing advertising demand drove the
increase in subscription prices. Moreover, both Seamans and Zhu (2013)’s and Angelucci
et al. (2013)’s data focus on newspaper markets prior to 2006; nevertheless, the U.S. news-
paper industry experienced the steepest decline in advertising revenues starting in 2006,
the year of the newspaper advertising trough (see Edmonds et al., 2013). Thus given these
changes, our time horizon offers unique advantages to studying our research questions. Fur-
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ther, access to data on multiple revenue sources (display, inserts, and classifieds) ensures
better coverage of our advertising data than those used in these prior studies. This helps
us provide valuable managerial insights into the importance and role played by display, in-
serts, and classifieds advertising on newspaper pricing and product portfolio management
decisions.
1.5 Data
We perform our empirical analysis using data from a leading regional U.S. newspaper that
prefers to remain anonymous. The data span 72 months from January 2006 through De-
cember 2011. The newspaper ranks among the top 50 in the country by paid circulation
and is a local monopoly in its market.6 In addition to offering the print newspaper, the firm
operates an online news website that was free for readers during the period of our analysis.
In this period, the ad revenues from the newspaper’s website accounted for less than 5% of
the firm’s total revenues.
On the readership side, we have monthly data on paid subscriptions for the newspaper’s
five major sub-markets (top five counties by circulation) for the three most popular sub-
scription options: Daily, Weekend, and Sunday. Subscribers residing in these sub-markets
accounted for 93.4% of the newspaper’s total subscription base, and the newspaper’s top
three bundles accounted for 95.6% of its paying subscribers. Although the total circulation
of newspapers typically consists of paid subscriptions and single-copy (newsstand) sales, we
have data at the sub-market level only for subscriptions. Hence, we use subscription data as
a proxy for readership in our empirical analysis.7 Subsequently, we investigate the robustness
6Blair and Romano (1993) and Dertouzos and Trautman (1990) report that most daily newspapers exist
as the only published newspaper in their local markets.
7Henceforth, we use the terms subscription, readership, and circulation interchangeably.
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of our results to the inclusion of single-copy sales in section 1.8.4.
While circulation data are at the sub-market (county) level, the subscription prices
do not vary at this level of disaggregation. For each subscription option, the firm charges
different prices to readers residing in regions within and outside the newspaper’s designated
market. In our data, two counties fall within the newspaper’s designated market (henceforth,
NDM) and account for 80-85% of subscribers. The remaining three counties fall outside the
NDM (henceforth ONDM). We compiled monthly subscription prices for each bundle within
and outside the NDM from the Alliance for Audited Media’s Audit Reports.
The newspaper provided us with access to monthly ad revenues and rates on the print
newspaper in three advertising formats: a) run-of-print (ROP, or display advertising), b)
pre-print (PPT, or newspaper inserts), and c) classifieds (CLAS) advertising. These three
advertising types generally constitute over 96% of newspapers’ advertising revenues. Adver-
tisers that opt for display advertising are generally business establishments with prespec-
ified advertising budgets. Classifieds advertisers, on the other hand, are generally small
business owners or individuals who prefer to post information about products (e.g., “for
sale-telephones”, “wanted-kitchen appliances”) or services (e.g., “moving services”, “truck
rental”). There is generally very little overlap between newspapers’ display and classified
advertising revenue streams (Seamans and Zhu, 2013). A majority of advertisers that pur-
chase newspaper inserts include grocery stores and retail establishments (Smith and Wiltse,
2005). Further, across the three types, there are differences in ad placement/ad appearance.
While display ads include graphics/firm logos and typically go alongside newspaper editorial
text, classified ads generally appears in a pre-specified section of the newspaper (the “Classi-
fieds” section). Newspaper inserts, which generally include product information or intimate
consumers about promotions, appear as a separate add-on to newspapers (hence the name
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insert).
Although our research question is motivated by the industry-wide phenomenon of in-
creasing print subscription prices, the data used in our empirical analysis come from one
newspaper. We assess the representativeness of the focal newspaper by considering the tem-
poral patterns in the total circulation and advertising revenues of the focal newspaper with
those for all U.S. newspapers. To this end, we collected the data on the U.S. print newspaper
industry from the Newspapers Association of America (website: www.naa.org). We present
these temporal patterns in Figure 1. These patterns suggest that the trends in circulation and
advertising revenues reflect the general state of the U.S. newspaper industry. Furthermore,
the correlation in both total circulation and advertising revenues of the focal newspaper with
those metrics for all U.S. newspapers is high (0.967 and 0.998 respectively). Together, these
data patterns suggest that the focal newspaper is representative of the population of U.S.
print newspapers.
1.5.1 Descriptive Analyses
1.5.1.1 Readership Data
As discussed before, our readership data contain information on newspaper subscription for
the three most popular bundles at its five major sub-markets (counties). Access to dissag-
gregate readership data enables us to explore heterogeneity in subscription behavior across
bundles and sub-markets. During our analysis timeframe (2006-2011), 14% of households in
the newspaper’s market subscribed to the focal newspaper. Cross-sectionally, the NDM con-
tained a higher percentage of subscribing households (18.9%) than the ONDM (3.6%). The
small circulation share in ONDM sub-markets suggests that the relatively few readers resid-
ing outside the NDM may have a higher valuation for newspaper subscription. Moreover,
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subscription prices outside the NDM are higher, possibly also to offset the higher delivery
costs outside the NDM.8
Subscription to the daily bundle provided home-delivery of the newspaper on all seven
days of the week and is the most expensive option (see section A in Table 1). The daily
bundle is also the most popular option among subscribers both within and outside the NDM.
Conditional on subscribing to the focal newspaper, 72.4% (71.6%) of readers within (outside)
the NDM opt for the daily bundle. The corresponding numbers for the Weekend and Sunday
only bundles are 5.4% (4.4%) and 22.2% (23.9%), respectively.
Between 2006-2011, prices for all three bundles increased steeply. In Table 2, we present
the percentage increase in inflation-adjusted subscription prices over this duration for the
Daily, Weekend, and Sunday only bundles, both within and outside the NDM. The Daily
bundle witnessed the steepest price increase of nearly 77%, both within and outside the
NDM, while prices of the Weekend and Sunday only bundles also increased by 52% and
38%, respectively.
We divide the bundle-level subscription data for each sub-market by the number of
households in that sub-market (# county households as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau)
to compute the corresponding subscription shares. Section (A) in Table 1 shows that there
is substantial cross-sectional variation in the subscription shares for each bundle within
and outside the NDM. Further, the temporal pattern for subscription shares in Figure 2
demonstrates that there is significant cross-sectional heterogeneity across the different sub-
8Many newspapers have been restricting delivery to geographic regions with very low demand, to poten-
tially save on delivery costs to these far flung areas (Mutter, 2009). To assess whether the magnitude of
such endogenous/“self-inflicted” circulation losses is economically significant, we collected annual data for
the newspaper at the zipcode level for our analysis period from the AAM Audit Reports. We found that less
than 5% of zipcodes drop out from the sample over the duration of our data (a zipcode would not figure in
our dataset or the AAM’s Audit Reports for that year if the newspaper stopped serving readers from that
zipcode, or if that zipcode accounted for less than 25 subscribers).
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markets within the newspaper’s market.
Since subscription prices vary by NDM/ONDM, we plot the share evolution by pooling
across sub-markets corresponding to these regions. From Figure 3, we see that the majority
of the decline in print subscriptions arise from within the NDM and for the Daily bundle,
which also has the largest readership base.9 To track the temporal evolution of bundle-
level circulation at each sub-market, we computed the average annual percentage change in
subscriptions over time at the five sub-markets for all three bundles. We present these in
Figure 4. Figure 4 shows that subscription shares for the Daily bundle decay at a faster
rate (between 8-11%) in sub-markets within the NDM compared to those outside (between
3-7%). Subscription shares for the newspaper’s Sunday only bundle are relatively stable (and
even weakly increasing) especially in sub-markets outside the NDM. This suggests that some
readers may be substituting from daily subscription to the cheaper Sunday only subscription
over time. On average, across the three bundles, the newspaper’s circulation witnessed steep
year-on-year declines within (outside) the NDM of between 7-10% (2-6%).
Examining the temporal path of newspaper subscriptions in this market, we conjecture
that readers’ WTP for news might be declining over time. Nevertheless, the concomitant
increase in subscription prices might also have contributed to the decline in subscription,
thereby making the case for declining WTP less obvious. Further, one explanation for the
higher rates of decline observed for Daily subscriptions is that this option witnessed steeper
price increases (77% relative to the 40-50% for the other two bundles). This correlational pat-
tern suggests that the newspaper may be using a price-based segmentation approach aimed
at driving away some low WTP readers for the Daily option by charging higher prices.10
9We plot the nominal subscription prices (i.e., pre-inflation adjustment) for each bundle in Figure 3 for
comparison.
10We discuss this intuition in detail in Section 1.6.3
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This motivates our exploration of the role of consumer heterogeneity in the subscription
price increases.
1.5.1.2 Advertising Data
The newspaper sets advertising rates for ROP and CLAS in dollars per column inch of ad-
vertising while ad rates for PPT are in dollars per 1000 newspaper inserts. By dividing the
revenues by these ad rates, we computed the quantity of advertising in terms of the number
of column inches for ROP and classifieds, and thousands of inserts for PPT. We present
temporal patterns in advertising revenues, rates, and quantity in Figure 5. From the first
panel in Figure 5, we see that the revenues from the all three types of advertising declined.
Section (B) in Table 1 presents the firm’s average ad revenues from each of these advertis-
ing types in years 2006 and 2011. ROP advertising on newspapers constitutes the largest
form of advertising and typically accounts for over 60% of ad revenues (NAA.org). While
ROP and PPT lost 57.7% and 43.4%, respectively during our analysis period, Classifieds ad
revenues experienced the steepest decline of 88.3%. The steep decline in display and classi-
fieds advertising has been attributed to the increasing shift in both advertiser and consumer
interest towards non-newspaper media such as Google/Yahoo (Sridhar and Sriram, 2013)
and Craigslist (Seamans and Zhu, 2013), respectively. On the other hand, industry experts
have argued that newspaper inserts have remained relatively stable in the face of external
competition primarily due to their higher targeting ability (Sullivan, 2012; Maynard, 2011).
Between 2006 and 2011, classifieds ad rates at the newspaper declined by 66%, possibly
as a result of the growing popularity of Craigslist. The rates for display ads and inserts
experienced smaller declines of 16.7% and 10.8% respectively. The decline in advertising rates
is very likely to have had an adverse effect on the newspaper’s advertising margins, thereby
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lowering their incentive to subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers. As advertisers
typically use a cost per reader (CPM) metric to inform their advertising decisions, we present
the CPM for each of the advertising options in Table 3 to track variations in CPM over the
course of our analysis. While the CPM for PPT was largely stable, that for ROP (CLAS)
increased (decreased) over time.11 In our estimation, we use alternative formulations for
readership to compute CPM based on two plausible alternative scenarios, and explore their
implications on our pricing conclusions. These scenarios correspond to different percentage
contributions of the Sunday newspaper towards total ad revenues, as discussed in industry
reports.
Lastly, in order to to internalize the actual impact of the decline in advertising, we
present the relative average susbcription and advertising revenue per reader in Table 4.
While advertising constituted 87% of the revenue contribution per reader in 2006, its share
decreased to 69% in 2011, suggesting a shift towards a more balanced revenue model. This
important pattern motivates our study of the role played by advertising subsidy in deter-
mining price increases to readers.
1.5.1.3 Changing costs
The observed path of increasing prices underscores the importance of considering the role of
changing marginal costs. As we do not have data on costs incurred by the focal newspaper,
we referred to the Inland newspaper database to estimate the newspaper’s marginal costs,
which mainly constitute the cost of printing and delivering the newspaper to readers. The
Inland Press Association compiles information on newspaper subscriptions, advertising and
11We present these numbers considering the total readership of the Sunday newspaper, as we discuss
subsequently. The trajectory of CPM calculated using reweighted readership was identical.
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circulation revenues, costs and margins for a wide panel of small and medium-sized U.S.
newspapers (Picard, 1989, p. 110). A cross-sectional comparison of newspapers in the
Inland sample showed that larger newspapers incurred higher cost per reader. Thus, we
used a circulation-weighted estimate of the average cost per reader for each year, in the
Inland database to arrive at estimates of the focal newspaper’s marginal costs. By comparing
these estimates, we found that the cost per reader increased only marginally at 5% over the
duration of our analysis. Thus, changing marginal costs cannot solely explain the steep
increase in subscription prices.
1.5.1.4 Changing quality
An alternative explanation for the increase in subscription prices is that the overall quality
of the newspapers is increasing over time. Sutton (1991) and Berry and Waldfogel (2010)
discuss the possibility that firms can make fixed investments aimed at improving product
quality, which, in turn can result in higher prices. In the context of newspapers, researchers
(e.g., Berry and Waldfogel, 2010; Fan, 2013) have used the size of the newsroom and the
average number of news pages as measures of quality. However, industry reports suggest that
the overall quality of newspapers measured along these dimensions declined the period of
our analysis.12 Thus, it is unlikely that changes in quality led to higher subscription prices.
12The PEW Journalism Institute reports that full-time professional newsroom employment
at newspaper firms fell by 30% since 2000 and by 6.4% just over the last couple of
years (http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/state-of-the-news-media-2014-key-indicators-in-media-and-
news/, http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/overview-5/). Based on our data, the average number of news
pages dropped by 27% between 2006-2011. Further, the avg. number of pages containing ads also dropped
by 52% during the period.
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1.6 Model
In this section, we discuss the decisions made by the three agents in our framework: readers,
advertisers and the newspaper firm. Readers choose either one of three newspaper subscrip-
tion options (Daily, Weekend, and Sunday only) or the outside option of not subscribing.
Advertisers make quantity choices on the three available advertising types: ROP, PPT, and
CLAS. The newspaper decides subscription prices for the three options and advertising rates
for each of the three advertising types. Of the three decisions, we take the first two, those
of readers and advertisers, to the data. Conditional on these estimates, we characterize the
optimal subscription prices and ad rates and compare their temporal trajectory with the ob-
served data. This enables us to comment on the optimality of the observed price trajectories.
Below, we discuss how we model these decisions.
1.6.1 Readership Model
We begin by specifying the utility that reader i who belongs to sub-market l derives from
subscribing to the print newspaper option m ∈ {Daily (Mon through Sun), Weekend (Fri,
Sat, Sun), Sun only} during month t as:
Uilmt = αilmt + β0i plmt + β1i newspgs t + ξlmt + εilmt, (1.6.1)
where αilmt is the intrinsic preference that reader i living in sub-market l has for subscription
to newspaper option m at time t. plmt is the inflation-adjusted price paid by the reader in
sub-market l for a month’s subscription of option m at time t and newspgst is the number
of pages of news content (i.e., non-advertising pages) available in the newspaper at time t.
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We use the number of pages of news (termed the news hole in the literature - cf. Fan, 2013)
as a proxy for the quality of the newspaper as perceived by readers (Berry and Waldfogel,
2010).13 The indirect utility from the outside option is normalized to be Ui0t = εi0t. Given
the nature of the decline in circulation faced by print newspapers and the general shift in
consumer interest towards outside news options, ex ante, we expect to find declining intrinsic
preferences (αilmt) for newspaper subscription.14 The term εilmt is an i.i.d type-1 extreme
value distributed error that captures user i’s idiosyncratic taste for newspaper bundle m
at time t. The term ξlmt captures the effect of aggregate demand shifters unobserved to
the econometrician, but observed by the reader and the newspaper firm. Examples of such
unobserved factors include any price promotions offered to subscribers, or unobserved factors
influencing news quality (trenchant coverage of popular market events such as the local
basketball team’s victory, or any changes to the newspaper’s popular op. ed. contributor
team). We recognize that the unobserved demand shifters are correlated with prices and the
number of news pages, which might render these variables in Equation 1.6.1 endogenous. As
we discuss subsequently, we control for this endogeneity by using instrumental variables.
In the econometric model, we adopt a specification for αilmt in Equation 1.6.1 of the
form:
αilmt = αim + γlXlt + δdt It, (1.6.2)
13Conversations with the newspaper firm revealed that it mainly relied on local reporting (typically funded
by the newspaper itself) to source news beats, and did not see big changes over time in the amount of news
gathered from syndicated agencies (e.g., PTI, Reuters...). Note that the news hole also indirectly captures
the effect of shrinking newspaper size as it becomes increasingly expensive for the news publisher to print
newspaper pages.
14We found that the number of pages in the newspaper containing ads also dropped by 52% over our
analysis window. The correlation between the number of pages containing news and those containing ads
was +0.98. This argues against the possibility that the newspaper increased the number of ad pages at the
expense of news pages (or vice versa), impacting the newspaper’s quality.
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where αim is the time-invariant component of utility that reader i derives from subscribing to
bundle m, Xlt is a vector of demographic characteristics at sub-market l at time t, that can
shift the intrinsic preference from subscribing to the newspaper. In our specification, we use
the time-varying median income in each sub-market as a shifter of the intrinsic preference.15
For added flexibility, we allow the effect of the demographic characteristics on the intrinsic
preference (i.e., γl) to vary by submarket l. In addition, we allow for temporal evolution in
the intrinsic preference by using flexible non-parametric controls in the form of year fixed
effects (I t). The year fixed effects control for changes in newspaper subscription preferences
over and beyond the role played by changing consumer demographics at each sub-market.
As discussed in the Data section, we observe different rates of decay in subscription shares
across sub-markets within and outside the NDM (see Figure 3). In order to account for this,
we allow the δ’s to vary over time differently across sub-markets within and outside the NDM
(d=1, 0 to signal within and outside, respectively). For identification, we set I t for the year
2006 to zero. We also allow the price sensitivity parameter to vary for sub-markets within
and outside the NDM to allow for differences in the rate of change of subscription shares at
sub-markets within and outside the NDM as a function of NDM/ONDM subscription price
increases.
In our empirical specification, we express αim as the sum of three components: (a)
utility from Monday through Thursday subscription (b) utility from Friday and Saturday
subscription, and (c) utility from Sunday subscription. A reader who subscribes to the
newspaper’s daily bundle derives benefits corresponding to (a), (b) and (c), while a Sunday
only subscriber would only derive the utility corresponding to (c). As opposed to using
alternative specific fixed effects, the proposed approach enables us to isolate the “part-worth”
15We compiled these county-level median income data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Commu-
nity Survey database.
21
that readers derive from subscribing to the print newspaper on different subsets of the days
of the week. This, in turn, will enable us to perform counterfactual analyses wherein the
newspaper restricts circulation to certain days of the week. However, an implicit assumption
in the proposed specification is that the utility from (a), (b) and (c) above are additive.
The specification in equation (1.6.1) assumes that consumers’ utility is not affected by
the levels of advertising in the newspaper. The rationale for this assumption is as follows:
conceptually, it has been argued that newspaper readers are not influenced by advertising
levels primarily because newspaper ads can be more easily skipped when compared to some
other media (Argentesi and Filistrucchi, 2007; Gabszewicz et al., 2004; Rosse, 1970). To
empirically test for this using our data, we allowed the levels of advertising (proxied by total
advertising quantity) to influence consumer utility. We found that its effect is negative, small
and statistically insignificant. We provide details of the various alternative model formula-
tions we adopted in Appendix B. Thus, we assume that advertising levels do not influence
readership decisions. This assumption also helps us break the circularity problem introduced
by the cross-dependency between advertising and readership systems, in determining optimal
prices. Furthermore, this is a common assumption made by papers studying the newspa-
per industry (Argentesi and Filistrucchi, 2007; Fan, 2013; Gentzkow, 2007), motivated by
a similar empirical finding that newspaper advertising quantity does not influence readers’
decisions.
Given our assumption that εilmt follows an extreme value distribution, the probability
that consumer i choses bundle m is given by:
Pilmt =
exp(αilmt + β0i plmt + β1i newspgs t + ξlmt)
1 +∑3h=1 exp(αilht + β0i plht + β1i newspgs t + ξlht) .
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In Equations (1.6.1) and (1.6.2), we allow for heterogeneity in three sets of parameters,
the intrinsic preference for news consumption (αim), price-sensitivity (β0i), and response to
the number of news pages (β1i). In our empirical application, we capture heterogeneity in
these parameters in the form of discrete segments similar to Besanko et al. (2003), Nair
(2007) and Liu (2010).
Our assumption of extreme-value distributed errors and a discrete distribution for the
heterogeneous parameters generates the following expression for subscription shares for sub-
market l and bundle m:
Sdlmt =
S′∑
s=1
λs
exp(αsm + β
s,d
0 plmt + βs1newspgs t + γlXlmt + δdt It + ξlmt)
1 +∑3h=1 exp(αsh + βs,d0 plht + βs1newspgs t + γlXlht + δdt It + ξlht) , (1.6.3)
where λs corresponds to the proportion (or size) of the market comprised by consumers
belonging to one of s=1...S ′ discrete segments. Equation (1.6.3) provides the expression for
readership subscription shares that we take to the data.
1.6.2 Advertising Model
We adopt a constant elasticity specification for aggregate advertising demand similar to
Rysman (2004) and Fan (2013). Formally,
ln(qkt) = µkt + ϕkln(rkt/Rt) + ιkt, (1.6.4)
where qkt is the advertising quantity for ad type k, which is calculated by dividing the ad
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revenues for each type by the respective ad rates in period t. Recall that we define quantity in
terms of the total number of column inches for ROP and Classifieds, and thousands of inserts
for PPT. The term rkt is the inflation-adjusted advertising rate charged by the newspaper
for ad type k = {1, 2, 3} standing for ROP, PPT, and CLAS advertising, respectively at time
t. The term Rt is the focal newspaper’s readership level (in thousands) at time t obtained
by summing over all county level readerships. Together, rkt/Rt represents the cost per 1000
readers (CPM) incurred in placing ads in the print newspaper at time t and ϕk captures
the corresponding elasticity.16 Since the CPM is a composite metric that captures both
the cost of placing ads and the size of the audience, advertisers typically use it to compare
alternative media options.17 The parameter µkt represents the intrinsic attractiveness of each
advertising type k as perceived by advertisers and is allowed to vary over time to capture
exogenous changes in the competitive environment (e.g., the growth of Outdoor, Hispanic
and Internet advertising options). Therefore, while ϕk captures the shape of the advertising
demand curve as a function of the CPM, µkt allows this demand curve to shift over time. ιkt
is a normal mean-zero i.i.d error term for advertising quantity.
As discussed earlier, we define Rt, which, in turn, is used to compute the CPM, based
on alternative assumptions regarding the metric of readership that advertisers use while
deciding on the advertising quantity. The metrics differ in terms of the relative weighting of
the Sunday and Weekday circulation figures. For the first measure of Rt, based on discussions
with managers at the newspaper and industry reports, we determined that 50% of the
16Since the ad rates for PPT are already in CPM, we do not divide them by readership in equation 1.6.4.
17Changing composition of readers in terms of their WTP can induce externalities for advertising demand,
partly because advertisers might value high and low WTP readers differently (Chen and Xie, 2007). To
explore this further, we tried alternative flexible specifications that allowed different CPM elasticities for
each readership segment. However, the estimation could not discern significant differences in elasticities for
the different segments of subscribers.
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newspaper’s ad revenues came from the Sunday newspaper.18 Based on this assumption, we
computed Rt as a weighted average of the number of readers in each subscription option such
that the weights satisfied the constraint that the Sunday newspaper is responsible for half the
ad revenues. We we provide further details on this weighting in Appendix A. For the second
measure of Rt, we used the sum of the number of subscribers for all bundles. Since Sunday
delivery is included in all three subscription options, the Rt term corresponds to the total
number of readers reached by the focal newspaper’s Sunday edition. The rationale is that this
metric is prominently displayed in the Alliance for Audited Media’s Audit Reports as well
as on newspapers’ websites, both of which are intended to serve as guidelines for advertisers.
We verify the robustness of our results to these alternative assumptions regarding Rt in
section 1.8.4.2.
Before proceeding further, a brief discussion regarding our restriction of zero cross-price
elasticities between the three types advertising is warranted. This assumption implies that
advertisers do not substitute or perceive synergies between the three types of advertising.
This assumption is partly dictated by the empirical reality that the CPMs for the three
types of advertising are highly collinear, which precludes us from identifying separate own-
and cross-price effects. Moreover, the assumption that advertisers do not substitute between
different types of advertising is reasonable in our context because the three ad types are
different in advertising form, the nature of target advertisers and advertising objective (as
discussed earlier). Furthermore, our conversations with managers at the newspaper revealed
that advertisers rarely switch between ad types, suggesting that substitution is unlikely to
be sizable. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that advertisers may perceive synergies between
the advertising types. Such synergies are likely to arise if advertisers employ multiple types
18http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/newspapers-stabilizing-but-still-threatened/
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of advertising simultaneously. However, our interviews with managers at the newspaper
suggested that a very small proportion of advertisers (<10%) generally invest in more than
one advertising type in each year.
In order to study the role of exogenous changes in the ad market on subscription prices,
it is important to account for the temporal evolution of intrinsic advertising attractiveness of
advertising in each option. The intrinsic attractiveness reflects the relative effectivess of ad-
vertising in that option, as perceived by advertisers; the advent of alternative media options
for advertising might have altered the perceived relative effectiveness of these options over
time. In our econometric model for advertising demand, we adopt the following specification
for intrinsic advertising attractiveness µkt:
µkt = µk + ϑktYkt + %kY˜ kt, (1.6.5)
where the Y kt are advertising type-specific year dummies. As in the readership model, these
year dummies capture changes in advertising levels across years, with year 2006 as base. The
term Y˜kt incorporates controls for month-to-month changes in advertising demand in the form
of a within year time-trend. We estimate a common elasticity (ϕ) for the three advertising
options during estimation. Ex ante, we expect Y kt to decline over time, resulting in the
overall advertising demand curve shifting downwards as a result of increasing competition.
Recovering a declining intercept for print advertising would help us evaluate the possibility
that the decline in advertising subsidy contributed to price increases faced by readers of the
print newspaper as discussed in detail in section 1.6.3.
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1.6.3 Pricing
We now discuss the optimal newspaper prices as a function of the readership and advertising
demand parameters. The profit function of the newspaper monopolist is of the form:19
pit = (pN1 −cN1 )RN1 +(pN2 −cN2 )RN2 +(pN3 −cN3 )RN3 +(pO1 −cO1 )RO1 +(pO2 −cO2 )RO2 +(pO3 −cO3 )RO3
+ (r1t − κ¨1t)q1t + (r2t − κ¨2t)q2t + (r3t − κ¨3t)q3t, (1.6.6)
where R(1...3), t and p(1...3), t refer to the newspaper’s print circulation and subscription price
for the three bundles respectively (with the N and O superscripts indexing NDM and ONDM
costs, prices and readership) and q(1...3), t and r(1...3), t refer to the advertising quantity and
advertising rate corresponding to ROP, PPT, and Classifieds advertising. The terms c(1...3), t
and κ¨(1...3), t refer to the marginal costs at time t associated with printing and distribution of
the newspaper and the marginal cost of selling ad space and printing advertising. The first
order condition (FOC) for the prices to readers and advertisers is:
19As discussed before in footnote 6, almost all U.S. daily newspapers are local monopolies. However,
these local newspapers may face competition from National newspapers and other news/advertising outlets
within their local markets. The outside option in our demand model helps us account for this competition.
However, our characterization of pricing assumes away competitive responses to price changes at the focal
newspaper. We assume that the impact on pricing of such competitive effects is small. A similar assumption
is made by other papers studying newspapers’ pricing decisions (Blair and Romano, 1993; Gentzkow, 2007;
Fan, 2013).
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
pN1t − cN1t
pN2t − cN2t
pN3t − cN3t
pO1t − cO1t
pO2t − cO2t
pO3t − cO3t
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. (1.6.7)
The zeros in the first six columns in rows 7 through 9 in the markup matrix Ω in Equation
(1.6.7) are a result of our assumption that the subscription decision does not depend on the
quantity of advertising. Note that the zeros in the off-diagonal elements corresponding to
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the last three columns of rows 7 through 9 are a result of our assumption that advertisers
do not substitute between the three types of advertising.
We re-write the FOC for subscription option m, m = 1, 2, 3, for the NDM as
(
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(1.6.8)
The FOC from equation (1.6.6) with respect to advertising rates for type k are given
by:
(rkt − κ¨kt) = − qkt(∂qkt
∂rkt
) . (1.6.9)
Equation (1.6.8) governs the subscription pricing rule for the newspaper firm. Recall
that the term cmt is the marginal cost of serving a reader of bundlem at time t and (pmt − cmt)
represents the firm’s price-cost margin. The first term on the right hand side in Equation
1.6.8 captures the extent to which the the readership of a subscription option changes with
a unit increase in its own price. The second term captures the positive offset derived from
bundle m readers substituting to the other two subscription options due to the increase in
bundle m prices. The terms 3, 4, and 5 correspond to the effect of ROP, PPT, and CLAS
29
advertising subsidy on bundle m’s subscription prices.
The price-cost markup for advertising in Equation 1.6.9 is a function of both the price
response of advertising demand and actual levels of advertising demand. Note that because
we assume that readers are not influenced by the levels of advertising in the newspaper, the
above expression does not contain a “direct” effect of readership on ad rates. However, from
equations (1.6.4) and (1.6.9), we can see that the optimal price-cost margin for advertising
will decrease with declining readership since advertising demand is a function of readership.
We now discuss how reader heterogeneity and changing demand conditions on the ad-
vertising side can affect subscription prices. First, consider the heterogeneity argument. If
we only consider the pricing of a single bundle without advertising externalities, the first
order condition will reduce to the first term in Equation (1.6.8). The optimal price for
bundle m is a decreasing function of how readership responds to subscription prices, i.e.,∣∣∣∂Rmt
∂pmt
∣∣∣. If the market comprises of two segments of customers in terms of their WTP, then,
∂Rmt
∂pmt
= λ1 ∂R
1
mt
∂pmt
+ λ2 ∂R
2
mt
∂pmt
, where λ1 and λ2(= 1 − λ1) are the relative sizes of the high and
low WTP customer segments respectively, and ∂R
1
mt
∂pmt
and ∂R
2
mt
∂pmt
are their corresponding sub-
scription responsiveness to prices. Given their lower WTP for the newspaper, we expect
that
∣∣∣∂R2mt
∂pmt
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂R1mt
∂pmt
∣∣∣. With the arrival of alternative sources of news over time, the low
WTP subscribers are more likely to quit, leading to lower λ2, and hence higher λ1. The
resulting decrease in
∣∣∣∂Rmt
∂pmt
∣∣∣ would render it optimal to increase subscription prices as low
WTP readers quit.
Let us now consider the role of ad subsidy. If declining attractiveness of the print
newspaper relative to alternative media options lowers advertisers’ WTP for advertising,
it would decrease the optimal advertising price-cost margin (see the FOC for ad rates in
Equation 1.6.9). This, in turn, would reduce the newspaper’s incentive to subsidize readers at
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the expense of advertisers. In our empirical specification, we capture the second mechanism
by allowing µkt to change over time via year fixed-effects.
1.7 Estimation
1.7.1 Overview of the Estimation
We use GMM employing instrumental variables (discussed in the next section) to estimate
the readership demand parameters. Estimation proceeds similar to Berry et al. (1995) where
the mean utility for each bundle is recovered via contraction mapping. Besanko et al. (2003)
provide a detailed discussion of the estimation strategy. The parameters to be estimated in
the readership system are: a) the heterogeneous parameters: mean estimate for Segment 1
(α¯1m), and deviation from Segment 1’s mean for Segment 2 corresponding to readers’ pref-
erences for newspaper subscription on the specific days of the week, price sensitivity, and
responsiveness to changes in news pages, b) the parameters governing the temporal variation
in reader preferences, viz., year dummies (δdt ), effect of demographic shifters - average income
- on readership (γl), and c) the parameter corresponding to the relative size of Segment 1
(λs). The advertising demand parameters to be estimated are: a) elasticity of advertising
demand to changes in readership adjusted prices (ϕ), b) advertisers’ intrinsic attractiveness
for ROP, PPT and CLAS advertising, and parameters governing their temporal evolution
(the year dummies corresponding to each advertising type) - µkt. We estimate the adver-
tising demand parameters using GMM, employing the orthogonality of demand shocks and
instrumental variables as moment conditions. We estimate the readership and advertising
demand equations sequentially in order to obviate concerns that a misspecification in one
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equation may contaminate the other (Villas-Boas, 2007).
1.7.2 Identification
We ask two questions in this paper: (a) are the observed trajectories of subscription and
advertising prices optimal? and (b) if optimal, to what extent do subscriber heterogeneity
and the decreasing incentive to subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers drive the
increase in subscription prices? The key challenge in answering these questions is that we are
dealing with a system of simultaneous decisions made by three agents: readers (subscription
decision), advertisers (advertising quantity decisions), and the newspaper (decision to set
subscription and advertising prices and the number of pages of news). Therefore, part of
our discussion on identification revolves around the exclusion restrictions needed to break
this simultaneity. The rest of the discussion deals with recovering aspects of the demand
model that are essential to answering our second research question. While answering the
first question, we do not assume that the observed prices are optimal. Rather, we compare
the optimal price trajectory implied by the FOCs (Equations 1.6.8 and 1.6.9), conditional
on the estimated readership and advertising demand equations, with the observed prices in
order to comment on the first question. Nevertheless, although we do not take a stance on
the data generating process behind the pricing and the number of news pages decisions, we
need to control for their endogenous nature while estimating the readership and advertising
demand equations.
The endogeneity of prices arises because the newspaper anticipates readership and ad-
vertising demand shocks such as periodic sports seasons while setting the respective prices.
In order to break this endogeneity, we need instruments that shift subscription prices and
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ad rates, but are not related to the demand shocks. In order to account for the endogeneity
of the subscription prices and the number of news pages, we use the costs associated with
printing and distributing newspapers as instruments, viz., producer price index for printing
ink manufacturing (NAICS 32591), the cost of output from paper mills (NAICS 32212), av-
erage wages of workers involved with producing and distributing print newspapers (NAICS
32323), and producer price indices of firms in industries that share similar cost structures,
such as book publishers (NAICS 511130). The premise is that while these costs will drive
subscription prices and the number of news pages, they are unlikely to be related to the
readership demand shocks, conditional on the endogenous variables. Liu (2010) uses similar
instruments to resolve the endogeneity of prices in the video games market. In order to verify
the strength of these instruments, we report the results from the first-stage regression of the
endogenous variables on the instruments in Table (5) section (A). These results suggest that
the instruments, along with other exogenous variables, explain 86% (96%) of the variation
in prices (number of news pages), with many instruments exhibiting statistical significance.
Compared to the first stage regression with only the exogenous variables, but excluding the
instruments, the proposed instrumental variables improve the R-squared for prices by 38%.
Therefore, we believe that our instruments are relatively strong (Rossi, 2014).
Similar to the subscription prices, the newspaper is likely to have set advertising rates
in anticipation of the realized demand shocks. In order to control for this endogeneity, we
use instrumental variables consisting of the factor cost of lithographic/offset printing ink
manufacturing (NAICS 325910) and producer price indices of advertising agencies (NAICS
541810). We collected these data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov). In
order to verify the strength of these instruments, we report the results from the first-stage
regression of the endogenous variables on the instruments in Table (5) section (B). These
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results suggest that the instruments, along with other exogenous variables, explain 76% of
the variation in ad rates. Compared to the first stage regression with only the exogenous
variables, but excluding the instruments, the proposed instrumental variables improve the
R-squared by 12%. Therefore, we believe that our instruments are relatively strong.
The other endogeneity concern in estimating the readership and advertising demand
equations arises from the interlinked nature of these two decisions. Our restriction that
advertising quantity does not influence the subscription decision implies that the readership
demand model is identified without the need for additional exclusion restrictions. On the
other hand, readership enters the advertising demand model as a covariate in the form of the
CPM variable (rkt/Rt term in Equation 1.6.4). This might lead to an endogeneity problem
if factors that are omitted from the advertising demand equation are also correlated with
readership. The premise is that factors such as an upcoming local election, local events such
as restaurant weeks or popular street fairs may increase demand for local newspaper con-
sumption among readers, as well as for local advertising. Therefore, the advertising demand
shocks are likely to be correlated with readership, thereby resulting in biased estimates for
the advertising demand model.
If the advertising demand shocks are induced by local events, the readership of print
versions of national newspapers in the local market is likely to be a viable instrument.
The premise is that readership of national newspapers is a proxy for preference for print
newspaper consumption in the local market, and should hence be related to the readership of
the focal newspaper. However, given that 76% of advertising for the focal newspaper accrues
from local advertisers, it is unlikely that the local readership of the national print newspapers
is related to the demand shocks for advertising in the focal newspaper, especially, if they
represent local omitted variables discussed above. However, if the advertising demand shocks
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at the focal newspaper include components that are correlated with the local readership of
national newspapers, such as national elections, the validity of the instrument is likely to
be questionable. In order to minimize this concern, we incorporate strong temporal controls
in the form of year fixed effects and parametric controls for within year changes in our
advertising demand models.
Based on the above rationale, we use the percentage of readers in the local market that
subscribe to the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, as an excluded variable.20
We find that the correlation between the subscription of the local newspaper and the local
subscription of these national newspapers is 0.8, suggesting that it is not a weak instrument.
We present results from the first-stage regression of prices and readership on instruments in
Table (5) section (B). These results suggest that the instruments, along with other exogenous
variables, explain 83% of the variation in readership. Compared to the first stage regression
with only the exogenous variables, but excluding the instruments, the proposed instrumental
variables improve the R-squared by 82%. Therefore, we believe that our instrument is
reasonably strong.
The identification of the extent to which two alternative explanations drove the increase
in subscription prices warrants further discussion. We answer this question by simulating
the optimal subscription and ad prices under two counterfactual scenarios: (a) without het-
erogeneity in WTP and (b) holding the intrinsic preference for advertising in each option at
the same level as in 2006. Therefore, decomposing the relative effects of these two drivers
cleanly depends on our ability to identify heterogeneity in WTP and the change in intrin-
sic preference for advertising in each option over time. Of these, the identification of the
20Note that the demographic characteristics (median county income) also implicitly act as exclusion re-
strictions and aid in the identification of the effect of readership on advertising demand.
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change in intrinsic preference for advertising in each option over time is relatively straight-
forward: while the type specific year fixed effects capture any year-on-year changes in the
corresponding ad demand, the within year controls capture the remaining variation.
Given that we use aggregate data on subscription, the heterogeneity distribution in the
readership demand model is identified based on how the observed substitution in response to
price changes between bundles and the outside options deviates from that predicted under
IIA. There are three sources of variation that enable the identification of heterogeneity in this
manner: (a) cross-sectional variation in subscription and prices across the three subscription
options, (b) cross-sectional variation in subscription and prices geographically across sub-
markets, and (c) temporal variation in subscription shares and prices. Intuitively, conditional
on the non-heterogeneous parameters, the functional form of the logit model would dictate
how low- and high-WTP readers would react to changes in subscription prices. Mapping
these predicted responsiveness to price changes to those observed in the data helps us in
pinning down the heterogeneity distribution.
1.8 Results
1.8.1 Readership Results
As discussed earlier, we employ a discrete heterogeneity structure for readership demand.
Following previous work (Besanko et al., 2003; Liu, 2010), we identify the appropriate num-
ber of segments by adding segments until one of the segments sizes becomes statistically
insignificant. In our model calibration, we recover two distinct segments. We present these
results in Table 6. Segment 1 comprises 8.5% of the market, and has a higher preference
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for newspaper subscription than segment 2. The remaining 91.5% of the market has lower
preference for subscribing to the focal newspaper and is also relatively more price sensitive.
Amongst subscribing households, 33% belonged to segment 1, on average, while the remain-
ing belonged to segment 2. For example, the preference for the Daily bundle (as obtained by
summing over the intercepts corresponding to M-Thurs, Fri/Sat, and Sun) is less negative
for segment 1 when compared to segment 2. We present the actual parameters for segment 1
and segment 2 in Table 6 for ease of interpretation, though we recover the deviation from seg-
ment 1 for segment 2 in our estimation. We computed the standard errors using a bootstrap
procedure with 1000 replications.
We find that the portion of readers’ utility attributable to their newspaper consumption
on Monday-Thursday is positive while those for Fri/Sat and Sunday are negative. These
results are driven by the fact that the Daily bundle has significantly more subscribers than
the Sunday and Weekend bundles. As discussed before, under the assumption of additive
utility, the intrinsic preference for the daily bundle is the sum of the intercepts corresponding
to Mon-Thurs, Fri/Sat and Sun. The corresponding estimate for the Weekend bundle is the
sum of intercepts for Fri/Sat and Sun.
Most year-dummies are negative and significant, suggesting that subscription prefer-
ences in later years were lower than those in 2006. To further visualize the effect of declining
preferences, we plot the subscription for each bundle in markets within and outside the NDM,
broken down by segment in Figure 6. Consistent with our discussion regarding the steeper
decline in Daily bundle readership, we see that Daily bundle readership in the low-type seg-
ment (Segment 2) decreases relatively substantially. This result supports the argument that
low-valuation readers of this bundle exit the market when faced with higher subscription
prices. Another way to visualize this is by inspecting a plot of the proportion of high-type
37
readers belonging to each bundle (conditional on subscribing to the print newspaper) in
NDM/ONDM markets (Figure 7). On average, across the three bundles, the ONDM sub-
markets consist of a higher proportion of loyal readers. This finding is also consistent with
the raw pattern in the data that showed marginally lower percentage decline in subscription
at ONDM sub-markets (Figure 4). Further, we see that the percentage of low-WTP readers
of the Daily newspaper within the NDM decreased from 61% in 2006 to 38% in 2011. As
these low valuation readers exit the market, we see that the relative proportion of high WTP
readers of the Daily bundle exhibits an increasing trend over time. On the other hand, there
is little or no attrition in the proportion of low WTP readers for the other two subscription
bundles. We discuss the pricing implications of differences in the evolution of readership
segment composition in detail in Section 1.8.3.1.
1.8.2 Advertising Results
We present the results from our advertising model in Table 7. The estimated advertising
demand price elasticity is -1.13, which is similar to that reported by Fan (2013) for a wide
panel of U.S. newspapers. When we omit the controls for within year variations in advertising
demand, the price elasticity of demand increases to -1.72%. Nevertheless, the key substantive
findings are similar across both specifications.21 The type-specific year fixed effects for all
advertising types are negative and significant. Moreover, these fixed-effects are monotonically
decreasing for all three types of advertising, suggesting a decline in intrinsic attractiveness,
possibly driven by lower perceived attractiveness of print advertising relative to outside media
options. As discussed earlier, the constant elasticity functional form would imply that the
21Our final pricing conclusions are not sensitive to including or excluding these within-year temporal
controls - the contribution of each explanation changes only at the first decimal point when we ignore within
year variations to calibrate the explanations.
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advertising sensitivity to readership (∂q/∂R term in Equation 1.6.8) would decline over time
as the intrinsic attractiveness of print advertising options decrease. Together, the decline in
intrinsic attractiveness and lower ∂q/∂R lower the newspaper’s incentive to subsidize readers
at the expense of advertisers.
1.8.3 Optimal Prices
Earlier, we asked whether the observed trajectories of increasing subscription prices and
declining ad rates are indeed optimal. In order to assess this, conditional on the estimated
readership and advertising demand parameters, we compute the optimal markups on both
sides of the market, as described in Equation (1.6.7).
We present the percentage change, between 2006-2011 in the optimal subscription and
advertising markups implied by equations (1.6.8) and (1.6.9) in Table 8. These results sug-
gest that the trajectory of optimal markups on both sides is similar to those observed in the
data; optimal subscription markups exhibit an increasing trend while optimal advertising
markups decline substantially. As a second check, we use the values of the optimal subscrip-
tion markups and marginal costs (collected from the Inland database, as discussed before
in section 1.5.1.3) to compute optimal prices. Given the increasing trajectory of optimal
markups and costs, we find that the optimal prices that the newspaper ought to charge its
subscribers also increase during the period of our analysis. We also find that this trajectory
of optimal prices is quite similar to that of the actual prices observed in our data (the cor-
relation between the two is 0.88). Therefore, increasing prices to readers is consistent with
optimal pricing behavior.
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1.8.3.1 What explains the increase in subscription prices?
Recall that we had advanced reader heterogeneity and lower incentive to subsidize readers
at the expense of advertisers as two reasons why it might be optimal for the newspaper to
increase its subscription prices. Given the optimal trajectory of subscription prices and ad
rates are consistent with the observed data, similar to to Liu (2010), we perform counterfac-
tual analyses to understand the extent to which the two mechanisms are responsible for the
increase in subscription prices.
We first consider the role of reader heterogeneity. In order to assess the extent to
which reader heterogeneity contributed to changes in the firm’s pricing, we first compute the
predicted level of readership generated by the model when there is no reader heterogeneity.
As in Liu (2010), we compute a homogeneous equivalent model using the segment-size-
weighted average of the heterogeneous parameters. We then calculate the corresponding
advertising demand using Equation (1.6.4). In order to assess the extent to which the decline
in the intrinsic attractiveness of advertising led to increases in subscription prices, we use
the advertising demand parameters to arrive at a predicted level of advertising demand
generated by maintaining perceived advertising attractiveness at the 2006 level by switching
off the estimated year fixed effects for 2007-2011 at their original levels (as they were in
year 2006). Recall that these year fixed effects capture the extent to which the advertising
demand curve shifts downward from year to year. Using the predicted advertising demand,
we can compute what the markups for the newspaper firm would have been without the
witnessed decline in the intrinsic attractiveness of advertising.
We present the subscription prices for each subscription option for years 2006, 2011
and the dollar contribution of each explanation towards the price increase between 2006
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and 2011, in Table 10.22 Let us first consider average price across all three subscription
options. These results suggest that within the NDM, reader heterogeneity contributed to
about 20% of the increase in subscription prices. On the other hand, nearly 80% of the
increase in subscription prices between 2006 and 2011 can be traced back to the decreasing
incentive on the part of the newspaper to subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers.
The results for the counties outside the NDM exhibit a similar pattern; reader heterogeneity
can only explain 12.43% of the increase in subscription prices. Overall, these results suggest
a conscious shift on the part of the newspaper from being heavily dependent on advertising
to a more balanced model where readers make a sizeable contribution too; while advertising
accounted for 87% of the revenue generated by a average reader in 2006, this share decreased
to 69% in 2011.
We further explore the decreasing role of advertising subsidy and the extent to which
the resulting increase in subscription prices can be traced back to different types of print
advertising. We report the relative extent to which different types of advertising contributed
to the price increase in Table 9. These results suggest that the decline in ROP and Classifieds
advertising primarily drove the subscription price increases. Thus, our results add to the
limited literature that has attempted to document the influence of the classifieds advertising
trough on the changes to newspapers’ marketing mix (Seamans and Zhu, 2013). Note that
while Seamans and Zhu (2013) document a much smaller impact of classifieds advertising
decline on subscription prices (3.3%), the end date of their analysis (i.e., 2007) corresponds
to the period when newspapers had just started increasing subscription prices. Overall,
these results suggest that the increase in subscription prices represent a structural shift
from a model where the newspaper used advertising revenue to subsidize readers, to a more
22Note that as we present the relative magnitude of the two explanations here, taken together, the two
magnitudes explain the difference between 2011 and 2006 prices.
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balanced revenue model.
We now explore the subscription price increases at the level of individual subscription
options. The results in Table 10 indicate that, for the daily bundle, reader heterogeneity led
to a $2.57 ($1.80) increase within (outside) the NDM. As a result of the exit of low WTP
readers, the proportion of high WTP readers of the daily bundle increased from about 39%
(62%) in 2006 to about 62% (82%) in 2011 within (outside) the NDM. These results are
consistent with the higher rate of exit of low type customers of the daily bundle (as seen in
Figure 6).
The effect of attrition of lower valuation readers is less pronounced for the other two
subscription options. While reader heterogeneity accounted for about 30.25% (18.76%) of
the increase in daily bundle prices, within (outside) the NDM, in the absence of heterogeneity
in WTP among readers of the Weekend and Sunday only bundles, the firm would actually
have charged them a higher price. Thus, reader heterogeneity kept prices lower for these
bundles as the firm continues to serve even the low-type readers of these bundles. This is
consistent with our earlier discussion that the composition of readers of each of the three
bundles evolved differently over the course of our analysis. Therefore, the newspaper seems to
keen be to retain the low valuation readers during weekends but wean them out of weekdays.
The rationale is that as a result of shrinking advertising, the gap between the daily and
Sunday-only subscription options, in terms of the revenue generated per reader, has reduced
over time; while the daily option generated $35.13 ($0.81) more in advertising (circulation)
revenue per reader than the Sunday-only option in 2006, the gap shrank (increased) to
$18.95 ($3.15) in 2011.23 Thus, while the average daily bundle reader contributed $35.94
23The ad revenue per reader is also based on the assumption that the Sunday newspaper brought in 50%
of the ad revenue.
42
in 2006, that number dropped to $22.10 in 2011. When we consider the cost of printing
and distributing the newspaper for six additional days, the relative profitability of the daily
option relative to the Sunday-only option is likely to have decreased over time.
In sum, results from our model suggest that the decline in advertising subsidy was
an instrumental driver of the steep subscription price increases faced by newspaper readers
over the last five years. As a result, the newspaper is moving to a more balanced revenue
model where readers and advertising contribute equally in generating revenues. Further,
the newspaper is using price as a lever to motivate low WTP readers of the Daily bundle
to migrate to more profitable weekend subscription options. Subsequently, we discuss an
extreme version of this strategy where newspapers restrict circulation of the print newspaper
to weekends, a strategy adopted by many U.S. newspapers, in section 1.8.5.
1.8.4 Robustness Checks
1.8.4.1 The Effect of Online Ad Revenue
The above analyses assume that the readers that quit the print newspaper as a result of
increasing subscription prices do not generate any revenue. However, it is conceivable that
some of the readers that quit the print version migrate online. Although the newspaper
in question did not charge online visitors for news consumption, these marginal readers
could still generate advertising revenue. If this extra online ad revenue is substantial and
the newspaper internalized this while increasing its subscription prices, our explanation for
these price increases is likely to be contaminated.
Nevertheless, incorporating the additional ad revenue formally would require us to (a)
characterize the switching pattern between online and print news, albeit within the same
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newspaper and (b) parse out the extent to which the subscribers quitting the print newspaper
and moving online are incremental online readers. Since we only have aggregate data on print
and online readership, the case for the inference of these two effects is likely to be tenuous.
In order to circumvent this problem, we make the following generous assumptions on the
extra online ad revenue generated as a result of print subscription price increases: a) all the
print subscribers that quit the print newspaper move to the newspaper’s online edition and
b) these readers are all incremental readers of the online newspaper. In reality, given that
there in typically some overlap in print and online readership, not every incoming online
reader would be incremental.24 We obtained monthly online ad expenditures for the
newspaper from the firm and backed out the advertising revenue generated by each unique
visitor to the newspaper’s website. Then we use price elasticities based on our model to
compute the switching rate corresponding to a unit price increase to the daily newspaper.
Based on these assumptions, we compute the projected online revenue for this new
higher level of online readership. We find an incremental online revenue of 2% in 2006,
which drops down to 1.1% for 2011,25 given the switching patterns. This represents a rather
insignificant 0.04% (0.29%) increase over print advertising (circulation) revenues. As a final
reality check, we compute optimal markups for the three subscription alternatives if the firm
considered online revenues as an additional revenue source while setting print subscription
prices. We then compare these markups, as earlier, to quantify the contribution of each
of the three explanations.26 We present this comparison in column (1) in Table 12. The
relative contribution of the motive to gain online advertising revenues is less than 5% when
24Interviews with managers at the newspaper revealed that between 20-25% of print readers also visited
the online edition over our analysis horizon.
25We provide these numbers for the Daily bundle. The numbers for the other two bundles are similar, and
even smaller.
26We present the comparison of markups for the case with readership reweighting, with Sunday accounting
for 50% of ad revenues.
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compared with those of our two proposed explanations.
1.8.4.2 Alternative Assumptions Regarding the Ad Revenue Generated During
Different Days of the Week
In our empirical specification, we computed the total readership metric based on the as-
sumption that 50% of the ad revenue came from the Sunday newspaper. Given that our
advertising data were not broken down by the days of the week, the cleanest approach to
addressing the differential extent to which circulation on various days of the week generate
ad revenues would be infer how advertising changes in response to variation in readership on
different days of the week over time. The premise is that the cross-sectional and temporal
variation in subscriptions during different days of the week will help us infer how advertisers
value readers within a week. However, empirically, we were unable to uncover significant
differences in advertiser sensitivity to readership on different days of the week.
In order to verify the robustness of the results to our assumption that the Sunday news-
paper generates 50% of the ad revenue, we use an alternative specification that uses the
sum of all three subscription options as a metric of readership (to compute the CPM). Since
all three subscription options receive the Sunday newspaper, their sum corresponds to the
reach of the Sunday newspaper. Therefore, in this case our advertising model would implic-
itly assume that 100% of advertising arose only from the Sunday newspaper. The premise is
that the reach on Sunday is prominently displayed in AAM Newspaper Audit Reports and
in other promotional materials the newspaper provides to advertisers. Therefore, advertisers
probably base their advertising decisions on this readership metric. In Table 11, we explore
the robustness of our results to this assumption.
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We find that the advertising demand elasticities with this reweighted readership (column
3 in Table 7) are largely consistent with those reported earlier. Based on these revised
elasticities, we recomputed the optimal subscription and advertising markups. We present
the results from this analysis in the last column of Table 11. Overall, these results are
consistent with our earlier finding that heterogeneity in readers’ WTP and the decline in
advertising were largely responsible for price increase between 2006 and 2011, respectively.
We also verify the sensitivity of the key substantive findings to alternative assumptions
regarding the extent to which weekday vs. Sunday editions of the newspaper contribute to
the total advertising revenue (please see Table 11).27 We see that our results are robust to
various plausible levels of Sunday advertising contribution (50-100%). Further, as we increase
the weight on the Daily bundle, the influence of heterogeneity in governing subscription prices
becomes more salient. This is consistent with the raw patterns in our data that indicate
a higher rate of exit among Daily bundle readers, as well as our model-based findings that
indicate that low valuation readers primarily of the Daily bundle switch to other bundles
or the outside option when faced with price increases. This underscores the importance of
accounting for heterogeneity among readers of the Daily bundle.
1.8.4.3 Accounting for Single Copy Sales
As discussed earlier, while we have subscription data at a relatively granular level of ge-
ographic disaggregation, the single copy (newsstand) sales are only at the overall market
level. In reality, the total circulation of the newspaper would comprise of both subscription
and single copy sales. Since the cross-sectional variation in subscription and prices that ge-
27Per the publishing industry’s pricing policies, advertisers are generally charged differential rates for
Sunday vs. other days. Hence the dichotomous classification of Sunday vs. other days (titled ’Weekdays’
for simplicity).
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ographic disaggregation yields is useful to identify reader heterogeneity, we considered only
the subscription information in our empirical analysis. In order to investigate the robust-
ness of our results to the inclusion of single copy sales, we used the single copy sales data
at the market level to scale up the county level subscription shares. We treated this as a
proxy for county-level circulation, including both subscription and single copy sales. The
assumption here is that the single copy sales at different counties are proportional to their
respective subscription levels. We then reestimated the readership and advertising demand
models using these rescaled circulation figures. With these new estimates we recomputed
the relative magnitudes of the two explanations. As in earlier analyses, we find that the op-
timal subscription (advertising) prices increase (decrease) during the period of our analysis.
We present the results on the relative extent to which reader heterogeneity and advertising
subsidy played a role in driving up subscription prices in column (2) of Table 12. We see
that heterogeneity and the decline in advertising subsidy explain 32.5% and 67.5% of the
price increases respectively, suggesting that our results are robust to the inclusion/exclusion
of single-copy sales.
1.8.5 Counterfactual Simulation - The impact of suspending print
circulation on certain days of the week
Our results suggest that the newspaper in question has attempted to migrate low WTP read-
ers from the daily subscription to receiving the newspaper only during weekends, especially
Sundays by employing steeper price increases for daily subscriptions. While price is one of
the available tools to effect such a substitution of readers, the newspaper can accomplish a
similar result by restricting printing and distribution of the newspaper to only a few days
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of the week. The main benefit is likely to be cost savings, which account for approximately
52% of publishers’ overall costs (Vogel, 2011 p. 371). During the last couple of years, several
daily newspapers such as the New Orleans newspaper Times-Picayune, The Detroit Free
Press, and The Detroit News, have restricted product and distrubution to a few days of the
week, while several other newspapers are reportedly considering such a shift (Ingram, 2012).
In this section, we use the structure of preferences recovered from the readership demand
model (presented in Table 6) to assess implications for newspaper publishers from restricting
circulation of the print newspaper to a subset of the days of the week.
Specifically, we compare the firm’s price-cost margins for the two cases where the firm
maintains or discontinues newspaper delivery on Monday through Thursday, as a benchmark
counterfactual product portfolio restructuring strategy.28 Demand for newspaper advertising
is known to be higher on Sundays, though we could not collect advertising data by days of
the week from the firm for this analysis. To this effect, we use parameter estimates from the
readership demand model, conditional on the assumption of additive seperability of utilities
from newspaper consumption for different days of the week, to offer upper and lower bounds
on the impact of restricting newspaper access to a few days in the week. Using the estimates
of the intercepts corresponding to the reader’s utility from newspaper subscription on Fri/Sat
and Sun only, we compute subscription shares for the counterfactual market where readers
have the option of choosing only between the Weekend and Sunday only bundles. We then
use these computed shares to calculate the levels of predicted advertising demand (using
the reweighted readership described earlier, to ensure the 50% contribution of the Sunday
newspaper to advertising revenues) which in turn enable us to compute the counterfactual
markups for the Weekend/Sunday-only prices.
28Due to non-availability of reliable cost-data at the bundle level, we do not estimate the impact of the
newspaper’s decision to suspend circulation during a subset of the days of the week on its profitability.
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The net benefit of restricting distribution to a few days of the week would depend on
the how much revenue the newspaper stands to lose. Furthermore, the new optimal sub-
scription and ad rates would depend on the number of customers that would switch to other
subscription options within the newspaper versus those that would quit. The substitution
would depend on whether we treat this as the newspaper (a) ceasing to offer a daily sub-
scription option or (b) offering a second version of the Friday, Saturday, and Sunday option.
Given our model formulation, the former would predict a very high customer migration to
the outside option, while the latter would make a much more optimistic projection that a
higher proportion of daily subscribers will move to the remaining subsription options. The
reality is likely to be somewhere between these two scenarios.
We present the results from the counterfactual simulation in Table 13. We present the
mean absolute percent deviation (MAPD) in all metrics for the most current year (2011) in
our data.29 While scenario 1 implies a reduction in overall circulation of 60% (68%) within
(outside) the NDM, scenario 2 implies that this loss is smaller at 49% (62%). Therefore, this
policy decision suggests losses to overall circulation that range between 50% and 70%. These
circulation losses would imply a decline of between 77% in scenario 2 and 82% in scenario 1
in advertising demand. These declines in advertising demand translate to a decrease in ad-
vertising markups by approximately 77% and 82% respectively. This implies a corresponding
increase in the markups for the Weekend (Sunday-only) subscription options to an extent of
204% (217%) - Scenario 2 and 215% (228%) - Scenario 1, on account of this change to the
newspaper’s product mix, resulting primarily from the decline in advertising subsidy due to
the lower advertising markups. Thus, our results suggest that a decision involving shutting
down weekday newspaper production would not only imply increases in newspaper subscrip-
29There is no meaningful difference in the MAPD computed for all years (2006-2011) on all these metrics.
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tion prices but further decreases to the corresponding advertising markups on account of a
decline in the overall readership (which results from a portion of daily option readers exiting
the market). Overall, our model predicts a decline in overall revenues resulting from this
policy decision of between $9.64 - $10.39 MM.
This reflects an approximate loss of $83 - $109 loss in revenues to the newspaper per
reader from this policy change. The optimality of restricting newspaper subscription to
three days in a week would depend on whether the corresponding cost savings are greater
than the revenue loss. The fact that several newspapers have implemented such shutdowns
suggests that these cost savings might be substantial (even though the focal newspaper has
not jumped on this bandwagon as yet). This notion is also in alignment with the claim that
newspapers could save a lot of money if the primary access to news was via the internet, as
online distribution helps save on newspaper production and delivery costs (Varian, 2010).
While shutting down print newspaper production entirely may seem extreme given that over
85% of newspapers’ overall revenues still come from print editions, the substantial losses in
revenues may have prompted some newspapers to restrict printing and distribution, as an
intermediate step in restructuring their product portfolio decisions, in order to save on costs.
An essential caveat to this analysis is that it does not consider the negative consequences
to the brand from the decision of moving away from a daily newspaper model, owing to
consumer backlash as in the case of some newspapers such as the Times Picayune.
1.9 Discussion and Conclusion
In spite of facing declining demand, newspaper publishers have increased print subscription
prices for readers. The overall revenue implications for the publisher from raising prices for
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readers may be especially nuanced in this industry as nearly three-fourths of its revenues
derive from advertising, which depends critically on the presence of readers. So why have
subscription prices substantially increased? Are these price increases optimal? We propose
and estimate a model to answer these questions, allowing for the influence of externalities
created by the firm’s subscription price-setting process on its advertising revenues. We model
both reader and the advertiser demand for the print newspaper, and tie them to a model of
the newspaper’s pricing decision.
Our results suggest that decline in advertising subsidy was a big reason for why readers
are increasingly facing higher subscription prices today. Thus, we supplement extant litera-
ture that mainly attributes price increases to heterogeneity in WTP, i.e., we show that price
increases in two-sided markets also stem from the platform’s need to balance revenues from
both sides of the market.
We also find some evidence that the newspaper firm adopted a price-based segmentation
strategy focused on charging higher prices in order to serve only the loyal readers of its most
popular bundle, possibly in an attempt at coping with the large revenue decline it has
witnessed over the last five years. This indicates that newspapers may be becoming a more
niche product serving a smaller readership base. Further, this result is also suggestive of a
change in the mainstream information dissemination role played by newspapers in the society
(Weibull, 1992). Finally, a shift in newspapers’ traditionally advertising-supported revenue
structures towards a more “balanced” subscription-cum-advertiser-funded model appears to
be an appropriate strategy especially given the nature of decline in newspaper advertising.
An appealing feature of our study is that the readership and advertising data used in
the estimation are similar to data that are typically available to newspaper firms. This
makes the model managerially useful as newspaper firms can apply our model to readily
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available data to inform their pricing policy decisions. However, our study also has some
limitations, several of which can be attributed to the nature of data we have available. First,
the access to detailed panel data on individual level subscription behavior would enable the
estimation of a richer demand model that is better equipped to generate implications for
targeted pricing (third-degree price discrimination) for the firm based on observable reader
characteristics. On the advertising side, our ability to capture richer interactions between
demand for the three advertising options, or to specify a demand model aimed at modeling
individual advertisers’ choice rules is restricted by the aggregate nature of advertising data
we have available. Our proposed modeling framework focuses mainly on accounting for
newspapers’ distinct advertising revenue sources and their role in the firm’s subscription
pricing process.
A limitation of our model is its inability to account for all the rich dynamics in the
newspaper advertising market. For example, equipped with data on ad rates for Sunday
vs. Weekday newspapers, one could study the different implications of changing reader
WTP for newspapers’ Weekday vs. Sunday ad rate setting decisions. Future work focused
on enriching the two demand models to include these features could generate interesting
pricing implications for the firm. Other examples of this include - a) estimating the optimal
advertising markups at the advertiser segment (Local vs. National advertisers) level, to
inform potential targeted pricing rules for the publisher, and b) specifying a richer structure
to capture the heterogeneity in different advertisers’ willingness-to-pay for access to higher
willingness-to-pay readers. It is very likely that such implications would be valuable to
marketing managers at newspaper firms as they design strategies to salvage their dwindling
readership base and advertising revenues.
Previous work studying the newspaper industry (Fan, 2013) has discussed the role of
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changes in market structure (e.g., newspaper consolidations/mergers) in influencing newspa-
per prices. Thus, newspaper consolidations may indeed have contributed to some of the price
increases in the print newspaper industry especially over a longer-horizon.30 Our ability to
account for such explanations is constrained by the nature of our data, i.e. the newspaper
that shared the data used in this analysis is not part of a large multi-newspaper or mass-
media group franchise. Thus, though prices in the focal newspaper’s market are unlikely to
be influenced by similar changes in market structure over the time frame of our analysis, it
is possible that prices at other large newspapers may be. In sum, we hope our empirical
study has shed academic and managerial light on price setting practices in newspaper/media
markets, and more generally in two-sided markets.
30Fan (2013) documents that over 75% of newspaper consolidations in her data (which range from 1998-
2005) occurred in the period 1998-2002.
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Tables and Figures
(A) Readership
Avg. subscription share Avg. subs. price (inflation
adjusted)
(% of households subscribing to the newspaper) ($/month)
Bundle Within the NDM Outside the NDM Within the NDM Outside the NDM
Daily 13.24% 2.62% 16.28 18.28
Weekend 0.98% 0.16% 11.76 12.48
Sun only 3.97% 0.86% 10.12 10.88
(B) Advertising Revenues
Year 2006 Year 2011 Change
Advertising Type (in Mill. $) (in Mill. $) (%, with year 2006 as base)
ROP 9.10 3.85 -57.7%
PPT 3.95 2.26 -43.38%
CLAS 4.04 0.47 -88.27%
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
% increase in inflation-adjusted prices between 2006-2011
Bundle Within NDM Outside NDM
Daily 77.22% 77.45%
Weekend 52.73% 52.52%
Sun only 37.74% 43.70%
Table 2: Subscription price increases for each bundle
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Year ROP PPT CLAS
2006 0.44 59.60 1.83
2007 0.42 57.27 1.75
2008 0.48 56.85 1.82
2009 0.50 54.88 0.98
2010 0.53 58.20 0.94
2011 0.57 59.30 0.97
Table 3: CPM for each Advertising Option
CPM for ROP and CLAS is computed by dividing the corresponding ad rate (in $ per col.
inches) by the number of readers (in thousands); those for PPT are in cost per thousand
inserts.
Revenue contribution per reader Year 2006 Year 2011
(%) (%)
Subscription 12.62 31.19
Advertising 87.38 68.81
Table 4: Relative contribution of reader and advertiser side of the newspaper market
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(A) Readership Model
Endogenous variable
Subscription Prices # News pages
Parameter Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
PPI Daily Newspaper
Publishers
5.82*** 1.16 0.17 0.11
PPI Book Publishers -4.76 14.51 0.46 1.35
PPI Printing Ink Mfg. 6.61 9.82 -2.68** 0.91
Avg Weekly Payroll
Newspaper Industry
-4.74*** 0.94 0.88*** 0.09
Dummies for each bundle
√ √ √ √
R2 0.48 0.86 0.91 0.96
(B) Advertising Model
Endogenous variable
Advertising Rates Readership
Parameter Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
PPI Advertising Agencies -0.76 0.76 -2.18 2.58
PPI Lithographic/Offset
Printing Ink
1.38** 0.59 -2.21 1.99
% Readership of other
newspapers
0.98** 0.35 1.08*** 0.12
Advertising type dummies
√ √ √ √
R2 0.64 0.76 0.01 0.83
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 5: First stage regressions of endogenous variables on instruments
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WITHOUT HETEROGENEITY WITH HETEROGENEITY
Parameter OLS IV Seg - 1 Seg - 2
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Pref (M-Thurs) 2.15** 0.18 2.32** 0.25 4.07** 0.04 1.45** 0.01
Pref (Fri,Sat) -1.83** 0.08 -1.75** 0.11 -1.81** 0.01 -1.72** 0.00
Pref (Sun) -6.83** 0.47 -6.68** 0.50 -5.62** 0.01 -7.00** 0.01
NDM price -0.04** 0.01 -0.05* 0.02 -0.01* 0.00 -0.10** 0.00
ONDM price -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.05** 0.00 -0.12** 0.00
# of news pgs 0.52** 0.11 0.43** 0.15 0.14** 0.01 0.67** 0.00
C1-Income 0.64** 0.07 0.64** 0.07 0.73** 0.02
C2-Income 0.46** 0.08 0.46** 0.08 0.62** 0.02
C3-Income 0.29** 0.09 0.29** 0.09 0.42** 0.02
C4-Income 0.58** 0.08 0.58** 0.08 0.65** 0.02
C5-Income 0.13+ 0.08 0.13+ 0.08 0.26** 0.02
NDM Y2007 -0.31** 0.06 -0.29** 0.06 -0.31** 0.01
NDM Y2008 -0.48** 0.07 -0.48** 0.07 -0.49** 0.02
NDM Y2009 -0.17** 0.06 -0.15* 0.07 -0.03** 0.01
NDM Y2010 -0.18** 0.06 -0.15* 0.07 -0.02 0.01
NDM Y2011 -0.31** 0.07 -0.27** 0.07 -0.19** 0.02
ONDM Y2007 -0.18** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05 -0.17** 0.01
ONDM Y2008 -0.30** 0.06 -0.30** 0.06 -0.31** 0.01
ONDM Y2009 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.21** 0.03
ONDM Y2010 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.34** 0.03
ONDM Y2011 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.33** 0.03
Seg. membership -2.37** 0.30
Seg. size 8.57% 91.43%
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 6: Readership model results
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USING RAW READERSHIP USING
REWEIGHTED
READER-
SHIP
Parameter (1) (2) (3)?
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Intercept ROP 10.26** 0.36 9.89** 0.41 9.48** 0.64
Intercept PPT 15.48** 1.71 18.07** 1.97 15.47** 1.71
Intercept CLAS 9.93** 0.28 10.11** 0.29 9.15** 0.05
ln(CPM) -1.13** 0.42 -1.72** 0.49 -1.12** 0.42
Y 2007-ROP -0.11** 0.04 -0.14** 0.04 -0.11** 0.04
Y 2008-ROP -0.27** 0.04 -0.24** 0.04 -0.27** 0.04
Y 2009-ROP -0.54** 0.05 -0.47** 0.06 -0.54** 0.05
Y 2010-ROP -0.54** 0.06 -0.46** 0.07 -0.54** 0.06
Y 2011-ROP -0.63** 0.07 -0.52** 0.09 -0.63** 0.07
Y 2007-PPT -0.10* 0.05 -0.13* 0.07 -0.10** 0.05
Y 2008-PPT -0.15* 0.07 -0.24** 0.09 -0.15** 0.07
Y 2009-PPT -0.46** 0.08 -0.55** 0.09 -0.46** 0.08
Y 2010-PPT -0.60** 0.07 -0.65** 0.09 -0.60** 0.07
Y 2011-PPT -0.71** 0.07 -0.76** 0.09 -0.71** 0.07
Y 2007-CLAS -0.20** 0.05 -0.26** 0.07 -0.20** 0.05
Y 2008-CLAS -0.62** 0.07 -0.71** 0.10 -0.63** 0.07
Y 2009-CLAS -1.71** 0.30 -2.14** 0.35 -1.71** 0.29
Y 2010-CLAS -1.82** 0.32 -2.27** 0.37 -1.81** 0.32
Y 2011-CLAS -2.00** 0.31 -2.44** 0.36 -2.00** 0.31
Within year variations - ROP Yes - Yes
Within year variations - PPT Yes - Yes
Within year variations - CLAS Yes - Yes
? - Using reweighted readership (with Sunday contribution at 50%) to calculate CPM
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 7: Advertising model results
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Between 2006-2011 Readership
Daily Weekend Sun
Change in subscription prices (data) +77.3% +52.6% +38.18%
Change in optimal markups +85.4 % +63.0 % +63.2 %
Between 2006-2011 Advertising
ROP PPT CLAS
Change in ad rates (data) -16.7% -10.8% -66.0%
Change in optimal markups -22.26% -30.15% -67.62%
Table 8: Optimal Subscription and Advertising Markups
Explanation Measure
Heterogeneity in Readers’ WTP 20.77%
Decline in Advertising subsidy 79.23%
of which:
Display advertising contributed 38.48%
Pre-print advertising contributed 10.23%
Classifieds advertising contributed 31.37%
Table 9: What explains the price increases?
$ contribution of
each explanation
NDM ONDM
Overall Daily Weekend Sunday Overall Daily Weekend Sunday
Price in 2006 ($) 10.26 11.02 8.66 7.93 11.40 12.39 9.25 8.34
Heterogeneity 1.31 2.57 -0.03 -0.04 0.36 1.80 -0.01 -0.02
Advertising subsidy 5.27 5.93 4.60 3.04 7.08 7.80 4.86 3.67
Price in 2011 ($) 16.84 19.53 13.22 10.93 18.84 21.99 14.10 11.99
Table 10: Components of the price increase for each bundle
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Explanation Readership Re-weighting: with
Sunday revenue contribution
(Weekday revenue contribution)
at
100% (0%) 90% (10%) 10% (90%)
Heterogeneity in
Readers’ WTP
9.94% 11.81% 53.18%
Decline in Advertising
Subsidy
90.06% 88.19% 47.82%
Table 11: Robustness Checks (A)
Explanation Considering the best case
scenario where all exiting
print readers migrate to
the online newspaper
Using readership rescaled
to include single-copy sales,
keeping Sunday advertising
contribution at 50%
(1) (2)
Heterogeneity in
Readers’ WTP
20.56% 32.50%
Decline in Advertising
Subsidy
74.94% 67.50%
Gain in Online
Advertising Revenues
4.51% N/A
Table 12: Robustness Checks (B)
60
MAPD (Mean
Absolute Percent
Deviation)
2 Options 3 Options
NDM ONDM NDM ONDM
Overall Change in
Readership (%)
-60 -68 -49 -62
Change in
Advertising Demand
(%)
-82 -77
Weekend Sunday Weekend Sunday
Change in
Subscription Markups
(%)
215 228 204 217
Change in
Advertising Markups
(%)
-82 -77
Change in Revenues - $ 10.39 MM - $ 9.64 MM
Table 13: Counterfactual Simulation - Effect of shutting off Monday-Thursday circulation
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Figure 1: Comparison of Readership and Advertising Revenue trends of the Focal newspaper
with those of the U.S newspaper industry
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Figure 2: County circulation shares
Month 1 corresponds to Jan 2006 and 72 to Dec 2011.
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Figure 3: Temporal pattern of subscriptions within and outside the newspaper’s designated
market.
Month 1 corresponds to Jan 2006 and 72 to Dec 2011.
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Figure 4: Plots of the average year-on-year % decay rates in circulation shares across counties
within and outside the NDM (between 2006-2011).
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Figure 5: Advertising at the focal newspaper
Month 1 corresponds to Jan 2006 and 72 to Dec 2011.
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Month 1 corresponds to Jan 2006 and 72 to Dec 2011.
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CHAPTER II
Exploring the Effects of Newspaper Paywalls
2.3 Abstract
Growth in online readership and the corresponding decline in the circulation base of print news-
papers have prompted newspaper publishers to identify opportunities to monetize online content.
As a result, several newspapers have begun charging readers for access to online news content by
erecting paywalls. In this paper, we study the overall implications to newspaper revenues from
operating paywalls, by using readership and advertising data for the New York Times before and
after it launched a paywall in March 2011. The overall effect of erecting pay walls on newspaper
readership and revenues is unclear. Recent surveys of readers of free online newspapers found that
a significant percentage (82%) of readers were ready to substitute away to other freely available
news options (e.g., blogs, TV, radio) if they had to start paying for access to news, suggesting that
the decision to charge online readers may influence their readership decisions. Further, it is well
known that newspaper advertising revenues depend heavily on readership, which also puts these
revenues at risk if paywalls lead to reader attrition. Lastly, paywalls are believed to serve an equally
important objective of stemming the declines in print newspaper readership, by preventing paying
print subscribers from switching to the free newspaper. By exploiting the structural break implied
by the paywall launch, we assess its effects on both print and online newspaper readership as well
as newspaper advertising.
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2.4 Introduction
Over the last five years, newspapers in the U.S. have witnessed a decline in their overall
revenues of up to 50%. While circulation and advertising revenues associated with the core
product, the print newspaper, have monotonically decreased in this period, those associated
with most newspapers’ online versions have increased. However, on average, online revenues
for most newspapers still account for a relatively small proportion (10%) of overall revenues.
A recent media article reported that for every advertising dollar gained online, newspaper
firms are still losing nearly sixteen dollars on print advertising (Thompson, 2013). The sub-
stantial nature of these losses to print revenues has prompted several newspaper bankruptcies
and in most cases, major restructuring decisions.
The objectives of U.S. newspaper firms’ major marketing mix reallocation decisions
can be broadly classified into three categories: a) preservation of existing revenue streams.
As a first step towards preserving advertising revenue streams, newspapers have dropped
advertising rates. Between 2006-2011, advertising rates for print newspapers have fallen by
15 % (in case of display and pre-print advertising) to 50% (in case of newspaper classifieds).
b) shifting the balance to reduce the reliance on advertising revenues. Most daily news
publishers across the country have reacted to the declining print ad revenues by effecting
steep increases to print subscription prices. Both subscription and single copy prices in the
U.S increased by 40-60% over the last decade, with the most sizeable increases occuring
in the last five years, possibly on account of newspaper firms’ intention to stabilize print
circulation revenues.31 This shift is believed to be an effort aimed at correcting the U.S.
newspaper industry’s historical overdependence on advertising revenues, when compared to
31Report “Circulation Pricing” dt. Mar 17, 2009 retrieved from the Newspaper Association of America
website: http://naa.org
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newspapers in the rest of the world: While advertising contributed 87% of revenues in 2006,
this number dropped to 69% in 2011, compared to the worldwide number of 57% (see Figure
9). c) exploring new sources of revenues. Over the last five years, the most popular strategy
among online newspapers is charging their online readers a subscription fee for access to
news content. As of 2013, digital pay plans have been adopted at 450 of the country’s
1380 dailies (Edmonds et al., 2013). Industry reports suggest that when combined with
print subscription and single-copy price increases, the launch of digital paywalls has led to
circulation revenues stabilizing or even rising.
Moreover, there have been many anecdotal claims that publishers can use newspaper
paywalls to signal the high purchasing power of their online readers to advertisers. There are
early indications from the results of survey-based journalism research reports that advertisers
are willing to pay higher advertising rates for their ads in paid online newspapers.32 Notwith-
standing the potential advertising gains, these added circulation revenues are believed to
potentially help with rebalancing the industry’s historic over-dependence on advertising.
Notably, however, not all newspapers that have decided to charge readers for online
access have succeeded in boosting their overall revenues. Several newspapers have lost on-
line traffic (Chiou and Tucker, 2013) as well as print circulation after launching paywalls.
Prominent examples include the Dallas Morning-News’ losing circulation by 9 million/month
after it instituted a paywall, the Memphis Commercial Appeal’s witnessing a 30% decrease
in traffic to get 1000 paywall subscribers, and the Columbia Tribune’s losing 25% of its
traffic and a shift to a local, free rival in order to secure $80k in revenue.33 When one
considers the fact that newspaper advertising is highly linked to readership (Sridhar et al.,
32http://sabramedia.com/blog/newspapers-battle-between-paywall-and-advertising
33See Blankenhorn (2013).
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2011; Fan, 2013; Pattabhiramaiah et al., 2014), firms that launch online paywalls may risk
losing online advertising revenues if paywalls lead to heavy reader attrition. Research in the
area of newspaper advertising has found that the increasing advertiser adoption of outside
(non-newspaper) media can influence big declines in newspaper advertising revenues (Sridhar
and Sriram, 2013; Seamans and Zhu, 2013). Thus newspapers’ advertising revenues may be
especially vulnerable in current times, suggesting the importance of considering the impact
on advertising revenues, of any pricing changes on the readers’ side of the market.
Lastly, a reason hotly debated in media articles about the second objective of com-
missioning newspaper paywalls is the preservation of print readership, by preventing paying
print subscribers from switching away to the free newspaper. A recent quote made by a
newspaper industry expert underscores this effect -
“The paywall at the Times of London’s web site has led to a drop of at least 65 percent in the newspaper’s
online readership. By most normal measures, losing two-thirds of your readership would seem like a huge
blow, but managers at the newspaper are said to be satisfied with that figure. This is because the newspaper’s
paywall is likely just as much about keeping existing print readers in as it is about keeping freeloading web
readers out.”
Print newspapers still account for about 80% of most newspapers’ revenues, suggesting
that the second objective of the paywall, namely, preserving the more valuable revenue stream
provided by print readers, may be important to this ailing industry. However, the evidence
of newspaper paywalls’ improving their print circulation is far from conclusive. Thus, it is
unclear whether charging online readers a price will unambiguously serve all the expected
objectives. In this paper, we use readership and advertising data for the New York Times
(henceforth NYT, a newspaper that has been cited in the media for its successful paywall
execution) to investigate the effects of launch of NYT’s paywall on its online readership,
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print circulation and online advertising revenues.
2.5 Data
We employ a mix of proprietary web analytics data collected from Comscore, for the period
Jan 2009-Mar 2013 (two years before and after the pay wall launch), and data we supplement
from various sources as described below. The web analytics data consist of traffic information
to the New York Times’ website, at the designated market area (DMA) level and contain
activity behaviors of users. We track activity of users belonging to the top 25 DMAs (by
NYT readership, the list of DMAs is presented in Table 15) - these DMAs together account
for about 50% of the total traffic to NYT’s website. The data include variables such as the
monthly number of unique visitors, page views and average time spent. A unique feature
of these data is that they provide a proxy for the newspaper readers’ online engagement
levels over time. Lambrecht and Misra (2014) use similar data to track online engagement
behavior of paying (vs. non-paying) users of ESPN.com.
The availability of DMA level data helps us account for the role of changing market
conditions (e.g., internet access) and user characteristics (e.g., income, age) in explaining
differences in website activity. To provide a benchmark for inferring the effect of the paywall
on the website’s traffic, we collected corresponding data for another National newspaper
website, USA Today. We believe the USA Today serves as an appropriate control group for
three reasons: a) USA Today is a National newspaper with a readership base most closely
comparable to that of the NYT (See Table 14),34 b) it is believed to be a close substitute
34Note that as the USA Today does not produce Sunday versions of the print newspaper, it is a closer
competitor to the NYT in terms of the weekday print edition. The NYT is the most popular Sunday
newspaper in the U.S. when measured purely by circulation numbers.
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to the NYT in terms of content and subscriber base (Kraten, 2013), and c) the USA Today
has been cited in the media for its abstinence from launching a paywall (Killoran, 2013). We
compiled data on the number of paid subscribers to NYT’s news website from journalism
research articles and online news sources.
Online advertising data consist of information on the number of impressions served and
aggregate monthly ad expenditure by advertisers who advertise on NYT’s website. These
data are broken down into 17 categories, as listed in Table 16. These categories are collec-
tively exhaustive and represent 100% of the ad expenditure on NYTimes.com. In order to
provide a baseline for the temporal evolution of NYT’s online ad expenditure, we compiled
data on online ad expenditure on all U.S. newspapers from the Newspaper Association of
America’s website (naa.org). Further, to enable tracking the effect of the paywall on print
readership, we also collected data on print circulation at the DMA level and subscription
prices from the Alliance for Audited Media’s annual Audit Reports for the NYT.
2.5.1 Descriptive Evidence
2.5.1.1 Online activity behaviors before and after the paywall
We present summary statistics for unique visitors, page views, duration and page views per
visitor for the NYT and USA Today in Table 17. The number of unique visitors to the NY
Times appears to have dropped sizably in periods following launch of the paywall, while
page views increased over time following a temporary downward blip (also see Figure 11).
In comparison, the unique visitors and page views of USA Today’s website increased. It
is interesting to note that the average NYT and USA Today user spent more number of
minutes on the respective websites in the period following the pay wall’s inception. While
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the page views per visitor to NYT’s website increased, those of USA Today appears to have
dropped marginally.
2.5.1.2 Paid Subscriptions to NYT (after the paywall)
As seen in Figure 10, NYT witnessed an increase in the number of paid subscribers in each
quarter after the paywall was launched in March 2011. NYT is reported to be successful in
amassing a sizable base of over 500,000 digital subscribers in just eighteen months after the
paywall was set up.35
2.5.1.3 NYT’s Advertising Revenues
As discussed earlier, our data consist of ad expenditure and advertising levels, broken down
by 17 advertiser categories. In Table 16, we present the cross-sectional variation in expendi-
tures and advertising levels (number of impressions served) among advertisers belonging to
each of these categories.
We provide a plot of the temporal evolution of ad revenues, impressions and rates in
Figure 12 by pooling across all advertiser categories. We see that the total impressions served
on NYT increased in the period following the paywall, as did total ad expenditure (obtained
by summing over all category level ad expenditures in each period). The avg online ad
rate (measured in CPM or the cost per 1000 impressions) appears to also have increased
marginally since the paywall’s inception. These patterns are consistent with the possibility
that the paywall had a positive externality on online advertising.
35Haughney (2013).
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2.5.1.4 Print Circulation Before and After the Paywall
As seen in Figure 13, paid circulation of both newspapers has been decreasing during our
analysis period. However, it appears that the circulation of NY Times is decreasing at a
slightly slower rate, relatively. This pattern is also consistent with the relative position data
in Table 14 where NYT overtook USA Today in overall circulation towards the end of our
analysis period (year 2013).
2.6 Research Design
The utility that a reader i residing in market j derives from reading online newspaper s in
month t is of the form:
Uijst = α˜jst + δjXjst + εijst (2.6.1)
To quantity the effect of NYT’s paywall on overall online newspaper readership, we employ
a panel specification of the form:
Rjst = αjs + βjτ + γIsτ + δjXjst + ςt + εjst (2.6.2)
where Iτ : is a time-indicator signifying pre/post paywall launch. As discussed before, we
use online readership of USA Today to establish a baseline for the effect of NYT’s paywall
(hence the s subscript in the notation). We use four dependent variables (the vector R)
consisting of the number of unique visitors, total page views, average time spent on the web
site, and the number of page views per visitor, for the analysis. The vector X includes ob-
servable market characteristics (e.g., business density), and user characteristics (e.g., income,
education) at the DMA level. The α captures reader preference for newspaper consumption
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in each market, while the β captures any time specific effects of the post-period (common
to both newspapers). γ is our coefficient of interest and measures the causal average effect
of pay wall on online reader behavior. We include non-parametric controls for any sea-
sonal/unaccounted time variations within the pre/post periods ς t in the form of month fixed
effects. The identifying assumption here is that the pre-period trends are similar across the
two newspapers. As we discuss subsequently in section 2.8, we find that these trends are
similar.
Between 2011-2013, the NYT introduced two policy changes to the number of free news
articles offered to users, as follows. Starting March 28, 2011, the monthly number of free
articles offered to readers of its online newspaper was limited to 20 (with the advent of the
paywall). The 20 free article limit was set to ensure that its more loyal user base paid a fee to
access news content (generating a new source of revenue to NYT). The limit was set high to
preserve visits to the newspaper by ad-hoc visitors (which generated advertising revenues).
In April 2012, the NYT revised the number of free articles downwards to 10, possibly to
motivate a higher proportion of online readers to start paying for online access. The month
fixed effects in our model specifications capture any changes to online newspaper demand
caused by this policy change.
To capture changes in the influence of the paywall on NYT’s advertising market, we
also specify a model of advertising demand. We specify the utility of advertiser f in month
t as:
Ufkt = µkt + ΘR˜t + ηrkt + fkt (2.6.3)
where r is the advertising rate, µ captures the advertisers’ preference for advertising on the
newspaper, and k = 1...17 signify the category that advertiser f belongs to (as discussed
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before in the data section). R˜ = f(Rt,ℵt) where Rt = ∑Jj=1Rjt (page views in each market).
ℵ: contains the cumulative total of paying subscribers to NYT’s online newspaper. Thus
we allow advertisers’ utility to be influenced both by the number of page views (in line with
the cost per impression pricing of newspaper display ads) as well as the number of paying
subscribers (who arguably comprise a higher WTP segment of customers). The estimation
equation for advertising demand is of the form:
qkt = µkt + θτRt + ϑ (ℵt) + ηrkt + kt (2.6.4)
The dependent variable q consists of the total online impressions in category k (in log
form) in each month t. The ϑ captures the increase in advertisers’ valuation for newspaper
ads with increase in number of paid readers. The θ captures the effect of aggregate page-
views on advertising demand. Note that equation (2.6.4) does not have an s subscript as
we only have advertising data for the NYT. The change in θ from pre to post indicates any
changes in the effect of online readership on advertising revenues. Estimating the parameter
θ can help us answer the question “do newspaper pay walls motivate a loss in ad revenue
(as page views decline)?” The parameter ϑ can help answer whether pay walls can help
newspapers command premium rates (i.e., through their ability to “signal” to advertisers
the access to a higher WTP readership base, as discussed before). The overall effect of pay
walls on newspaper advertising is given by (θ + ϑ) . Given the absence of the control group
in this analysis, we employ strict controls in the form of month of the year fixed effects, in
the model to account for time-specific shocks to NYT’s advertising demand. We also employ
advertising expenditure on all online newspapers to establish a baseline for the analysis as a
robustness check (discussed in the following section).
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The model/design for assessing the influence of the paywall on print newspaper reader-
ship is similar in specification to that for online readership:
R¨jst = α¨jst + β¨jτ + γI¨sτ + δ¨jX¨jst + ε¨jst (2.6.5)
where I¨τ : is a time-indicator signifying pre/post paywall launch. j, s and t stand for market,
newspaper (NYT/USA Today), and time subscripts, as before. We use print readership of
USA Today to establish a baseline for the effect of NYT’s paywall. We use two dependent
variables (as part of the vector R¨) consisting of the weekday and weekend newspaper print
circulation share (i.e., the % readership in each market, which is constructed by dividing
the market level circulation by the number of households) for the analysis. The vector X¨
includes observable market characteristics (e.g., business density), and user characteristics
(e.g., income, education). The α¨ captures reader preference for newspaper consumption in
each market, while the β¨ captures any time specific effects of the post-period (common to
both newspapers). γ¨ is our coefficient of interest and measures the causal average effect of
the pay wall on print newspaper readership.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Online Newspaper Readership
In order to measure the impact of the paywall on online readership (the treatment effect),
we regress the logged readership metrics on a NYT (treatment) indicator, a post period
indicator, an interaction of these, including demographic controls, as well as market specific
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and temporal controls. We employ strict temporal controls in the form of month fixed effects
(i.e., for each month in the data) to control for the influence of unobserved demand shifters
(for e.g., any changes to the NYT’s pricing policy as discussed earlier in the data section).
We present the regression results in Table 18. The paywall appears to have a negative
effect on the number of unique visitors to NYT’s website. Thus, the paywall appears to
have detered many casual/low willingness to pay readers from reading the newspaper, as the
unique visitors drops by 18% after the paywall.36
The NYT’s paywall has been referred to as “porous” or “leaky” in that some of its
(more sophisticated) readers were aware of an option of by-passing the paywall in lieu of
subscribing, after exhausting their monthly limit of free articles. Examples of strategies
that allowed by-passing the paywall include altering the browser URL, clearing/disabling
cookies during browsing, and downloading specialized custom utilities aimed at subverting
paywalls.37 However, the actual effect of paywall avoidance is likely small as the average NYT
reader was unlikely to have been aware of some advanced paywall subversion strategies.38
Nonetheless, we conjecture that, in the absence of the paywall’s leakiness, it is likely that
the paywall may have prompted a greater exit of visitors and led to a higher number of
paying subscribers, especially if the paywall were successful in “sorting” between low and
high willingness to pay readers.39
Notably, we find a null effect of the paywall on page views. However, in order to track
engagement behavior of NYT’s readers over time, we track the evolution in visit duration
36This effect is approximately 16% for year 2012 (when we consider April 2011 - Dec 2012 as the post
period).
37http://lifehacker.com/5783043/how-to-keep-reading-the-ny-times-for-free
38http://blog.sethroberts.net/2013/10/08/the-emperors-new-clothes-and-the-new-york-times-paywall/,
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/08/12/how-the-nyt-paywall-is-working/
39On the other hand, the effect on online ad revenues is likely lower, given that it is probably closely linked
to the overall effect of a more strictly enforced paywall on page views to NYTimes.com.
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as well as the number of pages viewed per visitor to these websites. We see that, in the
period following the paywall, the average reader of the NYT appears to stay 13% longer
on the website, as well as view 16% more number of pages, highlighting the possible online
engagement benefits of NYT’s paywall.
2.7.2 Online Advertising
We present the results from the regression using logged online ad expenditure, ad rate and
advertising levels (# of impressions) as dependent measures in Table 19. The specification
mainly allows us to track how these measures evolved over time. We find that online ad
expenditure, online ad rates and online ad levels increased in the period following the paywall.
To help establish a baseline for tracking online advertising expenditure (especially since this
analysis lacks a control group), we compute the % share of online advertising on NYT as a
proportion of advertising expenditure on all online newspapers in the U.S. (data compiled
from NAA.org). This allows us to assess whether NYT’s online advertising grew over and
beyond the category after the paywall. We find similar results when we use advertising
shares, highlighting the benefit of the paywall on NYT’s online advertising.
The high correlation (0.83) between page views and cumulative online subscriber base
over time precluded us from using subscriber base as a covariate in the model. Further, note
that by design, the count of the paid subscriber base is available only after the paywall’s
inception. This invalidates using the post-period indicator as well as the subscriber base
contemporaneously in the model. We estimated alternative model specifications omitting
the post period dummy and including the subscriber base, but found the effect to be non-
significant. Thus, we do not include the subscriber base as a covariate in the online ad
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demand model. One of the key online analytics metrics said to influence online advertising
decisions is the number of page views of the website (Lambrecht and Misra, 2014). Confirm-
ing expectation, we find a positive significant impact of page views in predicting advertising
levels. Thus, while it is theoretically possible that if the paywall had an adverse impact
on the newspaper’s page views, this can lead to a decline in advertising as well. However,
we find that, in all cases, NYT witnessed increases in advertising in the period following
the paywall. This can be partially rationalized by the fact that the decline in NYT’s page
views was not substantial (the effect is non-significant, as discussed earlier) on account of
the paywall.
In sum, our results of higher online engagement of NYT’s readers after the paywall
are consistent with the observed increase in online advertising. An essential caveat to these
results may be in order: our choice of NYT was motivated mainly based on media reports
of its success with executing a paywall. While these media reports did not discuss specifics
especially on the advertising gains for NYT from the paywall, our results appear to be
consistent with claims in these media reports. However, the extensibility of these results to
cases involving other local newspapers’ paywalls may be nuanced as NYT is one of the more
popular National newspapers. In fact, it is quite likely that the ability of the NYT to charge
premium advertising rates as well as attract paying subscribers, rests on its reputation and
its unique and differentiated content offering.
2.7.3 Print Readership
We report results of regressions employing weekday and weekend print newspaper circulation
share as dependent variables in Table 20. Similar to our previous setup, we employ the
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print readership of USA Today as a control group for studying the evolution of NY Times’
circulation share in the period following the paywall. We also include demographic controls
(political leaning, education, income, business density etc.) to help account for market-
specific variation in subscription shares of the newspapers. We find evidence of the NY
Times’ print circulation decreasing at a slower rate compared to USA Today, as indicated
by a positive significant coefficient on the (NYT*post_paywall) interaction term for both
weekday and weekend share regressions. These results suggest a positive effect of the paywall
on print newspaper circulation, especially for NYT. Thus, our results are consistent with the
second objective of the paywall: stemming the decline in print readership. As discussed
earlier, preserving a print reader is believed to be about 16 times as valuable, in revenue
terms, than an online reader. Thus, newspaper paywalls may also stand to provide an
important allied benefit of slowing the decline in print readership, thus helping preserve a
legacy revenue source.40
2.8 Robustness Checks
In this section, we verify the robustness of the effect of the paywall on print readership by:
a) exploiting a larger sample of markets and a longer analysis time window, and b) exploring
the implication of alternative definitions of control group to benchmark the effect of the
paywall. First, we collect data on weekday and weekend print newspaper readership for a
longer time window (2005-2012) and a larger sample of DMAs (N=202, which includes all
available DMAs in the U.S. for the NYT). We collect the corresponding information for the
newspaper we previously chose as our control group: USA Today. In addition, we collect
40As discussed earlier, nearly 80% of revenues are believed to accrue from print editions, underscoring the
importance of this legacy revenue source for newspaper publishers.
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these data for Wall Street Journal (WSJ). The WSJ commissioned a paywall back in 1997,
which remained in effect over the course of our analysis. This gives us the opportunity
to benchmark the results of the paywall on NYT’s print readership against that of two
newspapers: one that did not offer a paywall (USA Today) and one that did (WSJ). From
these analyses, we choose to employ the more conservative estimate of the gain in NYT’s
print readership in our calculation of the revenue impact of its paywall.
We present the results from these models in Tables 21 and 22. As discussed earlier, the
identification of the effect of the paywall depends on extent to which the pre-period trends
for the NYT is similar to that for the control group newspapers. We present the average
annual % change in circulation share for each newspaper in the pre-period in Table 23 -
we see that these numbers are similar, by and large. While the average annual % change
in circulation for NYT and WSJ are more similar, the WSJ’s print circulation appears to
have decayed at a slightly slower rate overall. We include a newspaper specific time trend
in the model to account for any differences in the temporal evolution in each newspaper’s
circulation share, in order to avoid any biases introduced by differential trends in circulation
on our estimates. To verify that the observed patterns in print subscription shares were
not primarily on account of changes in print subscription prices, we also incorporate the
subscription prices of the respective newspapers in each period in the model, as a covariate.
Thus, our estimate of the paywall’s effect on print readership is obtained by exploiting the
residual variation in shares after accounting for those motivated by changes in print prices.
We account for the potential endogeneity of price using instrumental variables: e.g., producer
price indices for printing ink manufacturing (NAICS 32591), the cost of output from paper
mills (NAICS 32212), and producer price indices of firms in industries that share similar cost
structures, such as book publishers (NAICS 511130). Overall, we find a significant positive
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effect of the paywall on NYT’s print newspaper readership, while considering either USA
Today or WSJ as the control group.41
Effect of temporary breaks in NYT’s paywall: The NYT and the WSJ temporarily took down
their paywalls for a brief period once each in October 2012 - following the Hurricane Sandy,
and November 2012 - due to the upcoming Elections (Fiegerman, 2012). This change may
have resulted in higher visits and/or page views to both newspapers’ websites as users did
not face the paywall upon encountering their free article limit. The effect of such a upward
shift in demand, though temporary, would normally be picked up by the corresponding
month fixed effect in the online readership demand model.42 However, as we may be more
interested in accurately attributing these temporary shifts in demand to the paywall, we
re-estimate the model by switching off the post-paywall indicator variable (“post”) for these
two months. With this change, the effect of NYT’s paywall on its unique visitors (page views
per visitor) drops to 16% (11%) from the 18% (16%) seen earlier. By and large, we find that
the results are substantively invariant to attributing these temporary changes to the paywall
or to seasonal demand variations.
2.9 Revenue Implication of the Paywall
What is the impact of the NYT’s paywall on its overall revenues? In order to answer this
question, we employ industry data as well as our model estimates to compute the revenue
41Note that the effect drops to marginal significance when we include the newspaper specific time trends.
However, in all cases, the p-values are quite close to the 5% significance levels (the p-values range from 0.052
to 0.055), except for the regression on NYT’s weekend circulation shares when we use USA Today as the
control group.
42Also note that the change in traffic prompted by such a policy change would potentially be more con-
cerning if only one (but not both) of these newspapers had chosen to temporarily take down the paywall in
this period, than otherwise.
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impact of the paywall. We first consider online subscriptions, which is a new source of revenue
to newspapers on account of the paywall. At the end of our analysis period in 2013, 500,000
readers had signed up for NYT’s paid membership. While the NYT offered various pricing
tiers for different subscription plans ($3.75 per week for access to NYTimes.com, $5 per
week for online+iPad access, $8.75 per week for unlimited access on all devices),43 we do not
have information on the distribution of paid subscriptions across these pricing plans. Thus,
we use the price of the cheapest plan ($3.75 per week) to arrive at the most conservative
estimate for NYT’s online subscription revenues. Using this metric, we compute that the
NYT gained approximately $97.5 million in online subscription revenues in 2013. We next
discuss the impact on online advertising. Given that the NYT gained approximately 3% in
online revenues (compared to the category level baseline of online newspaper advertising),
we can attribute $5.16 million (3% of the $172 million in online ad revenues) to the paywall.
To quantify the effect on print readership, we multiply NYT’s paid subscriber base in
2013: 1.35 million with the revenue per reader: $405.6 per year (subscription price of $7.8 per
week * 52 weeks). We then multiply this with the effect of the paywall on print readership
(considering the conservative estimate of 9.9%) to arrive at the revenue estimate for the
paywall’s effect on print subscription. Thus, the paywall contributed $54.4 million in print
subscription revenue to NYT.
The net benefit from the paywall can be computed as the sum of the three revenue
components: online subscription, online advertising and print subscription, which together
amount to a gain of approximately $157 million. This revenue increment represents 12%
of NYT’s total revenues in 2013. Thus, this research is one of the first to offer empirical
evidence for a positive economic return from newspaper paywalls, by documenting that the
43http://www.nytimes.com/subscriptions/Multiproduct/lp5558.html – retrieved May 2013.
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NYT paywall was responsible for at least a 12% gain in its total revenues within a period of
two years since its inception.44
Caveats and Limitations
A few caveats and limitations are in order. First, it is important to note that the above rev-
enue impact does not consider the effect of print advertising, due mainly to non-availability
of print advertising data. Given that we find a positive effect of the paywall on print read-
ership, it is likely that the paywall also had a positive effect on print advertising revenues
(assuming print advertisers value the access to a larger base of readers, which generally holds
true). However, if advertisers are actively switching between print and online newspaper ver-
sions, it is possible that the observed growth in online advertising due to the paywall may
be in part due to advertiser substitution away from print advertising. While this may be
plausible, Sridhar and Sriram (2013) report that this substitution effect is likely quite small,
viewed in the light of advertiser substitution between newspaper and non-newspaper media,
which is the more consequential substitution effect.
Second, two explanations could be responsible for the observed revenue bump: higher
engagement of online readers, and self-selection. The higher engagement explanation would
state that the average paying subscriber stays longer on the NYT website, and visits more
frequently, thus possibly contributing more advertising. On the other hand, the paywall could
also work as a sorting mechanism between low and high willingness to pay readers, with low
WTP readers switching away upon encountering the paywall (the selection explanation).
We are unable to disentangle these two effects in our data, owing mainly to our inability to
44When we calculate the revenue benefit for 2012, we find very similar results, with the paywall contributing
approximately 10% of year 2012 revenues.
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separate out paying and non-paying readers’ contributions to online page views as well as
advertising. However, note that from the news publisher’s more pragmatic perspective, it
probably matters less which of these two explanations is driving the economic returns from
the paywall.
Finally, an important overarching question pertains to the timing of the paywall launch.
Given the fast evolving market conditions and shrinking industry revenues, it is possible,
and indeed likely, that the paywall’s launch was an endogenously determined decision by
the newspaper. Compared to the newspaper industry’s heyday in the period before it faced
steep competition for consumer/advertiser attention from new media sources (such as Google,
Craigslist, news aggregators, Facebook etc.), online news was kept free possibly with a view of
monetizing the gains in online ad revenues on account of the larger readership base accessing
the newspaper’s free online offering. Over the last five years, however, motivated mainly by
a steep decline in their primary source of revenues: advertising, newspapers have actively
pursued alternative revenue streams to ensure survival. Newspaper paywalls can be viewed
as a prominent effort in this direction. Rather than offering normative nor prescriptive
guidelines for setting up paywalls or managing their timing, this research aims to empirically
quantify the impact on the firm’s revenues conditional on its decision to charge readers for
online news content. The fact that close to a third of all newspapers (450 out of 1380) have
recently set up paywalls makes studying the revenue impact of such strategies a topical and
important question.
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2.10 Conclusion
Newspaper paywalls are becoming an increasingly prevalent phenomenon, with over 50%
of newspapers in the U.S. having either implemented or actively considering setting up a
paywall. The popular belief is that paywalls may provide a much welcome new source
of revenue: online subscriptions. However, as suggested by various surveys of newspaper
readers, newspapers stand the risk of driving away readers who are not willing to pay for
online news. As online ad revenues are heavily linked to newspaper readership, newspapers
also stand to putting these revenues at risk if the paywall leads to heavy reader attrition.
Thus, the overall impact of setting up newspaper paywalls is far from conclusive. In this
study, we employ data on online readership and advertising, and print readership of New
York Times to assess the overall impact of the paywall it instituted in March 2011. We find
that NYT’s pay wall appears to have driven away some readers, as evidenced by a decline
in the number of unique visitors to its website after the paywall. On the other hand, our
results suggest that, following the paywall, the average NY Times reader visits the website
more frequently and also stays longer, implying that paywalls may provide a key advantage
of greater engagement of online readers. Overall, this research is the first of its kind to offer
empirical evidence for positive economic returns accrued to information media firms from
the decision to charge readers for access to online news content.
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Tables and Figures
Comparison of NYT and USA Today’s newspaper readership (print + online)
Newspaper Rank in
2010
Rank in
2011
Rank in
2013
Circulation
in 2011
Circulation
in 2013
Wall Street Journal 1 1 1 2,069,169 2,378,827
USA Today 2 2 3 1,784,242 1,674,306
New York Times 3 3 2 1,150,589 1,865,318
LA Times 4 6 4 605,677 653,868
San Jose Mercury News 5 4 5 572,998 583,998
Table 14: Top Newspapers in the U.S. by circulation
Source: Alliance for Audited Media’s annual Newspaper Audit Reports;
http://www.thepaperboy.com/usa-top-100-newspapers.cfm
Rank DMA Rank DMA Rank DMA Rank DMA Rank DMA
1 New York 6 Washington
D.C.
11 Minneapolis
- St. Paul
16 Tampa -
St. Pete -
Sarasota
21 Cleveland
2 Los Angeles 7 San Fran -
Oakland -
San Jose
12 Phoenix 17 Orlando -
Daytona
Beach -
Melbourne
22 Pittsburgh
3 Chicago 8 Dallas - Ft.
Worth
13 Detroit 18 Indianapolis 23 Miami - Ft.
Lauderdale
4 Boston 9 Atlanta 14 Houston 19 Denver 24 Sacramento
- Stockton -
Modesto
5 Philadelphia 10 Seattle -
Tacoma
15 Portland 20 Hartford -
New Haven
25 Charlotte
Table 15: Top 25 DMAs for NYT
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Category Avg expenditure
($)
Avg impressions
served (millions)
Avg ad rate ($
per 1000
impressions)
Automotive 335,333.39 23.88 13.82
Business Services 60,968.42 3.86 15.40
Computers & Tech 500,483.30 34.94 13.91
Consumer Goods 207,366.20 14.59 13.83
Education 204,868.28 14.33 13.91
Finance 2,118,209.36 148.53 13.83
Government 206,599.25 11.67 14.59
Health 129,021.56 9.09 13.84
Media & Entertainment 1,414,117.27 112.59 13.84
Multi-Category 5,333,347.83 817.52 6.90
Online Media 839,434.78 531.94 1.88
Public Services 169,680.47 11.73 14.89
Retail 1,065,373.87 72.09 13.89
Sports & Rec 57,638.59 4.29 13.90
Telecommunications 290,454.41 22.09 13.80
Travel 708,689.67 52.75 13.89
Table 16: Advertising data broken down by category
NY Times USA Today
Pre Post Pre Post
Uniq Visitors 701,330 670,543 318,012 367,986
Page Views (millions) 11.70 13.30 2.90 3.50
Duration (min) 12.90 20.10 2.63 3.40
Page Views Per Visitor 15.50 17.70 9.92 9.71
Table 17: Summary statistics before and after the paywall
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DV= ln (uniq
visitors)
ln (pg views) ln (duration) ln (pg views
per visitor)
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
NYT 0.669** 0.011 1.185** 0.036 1.376** 0.039 0.509** 0.032
Post 0.052 0.042 0.491** 0.135 -0.166 0.146 0.105 0.120
NYT*Post -0.188** 0.016 -0.036 0.052 0.130** 0.056 0.159** 0.046
Political Leaning
in 2012 election
-0.349** 0.019 -0.261** 0.060 -0.120+ 0.064 0.083 0.054
Population in
2012, DMA
0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000
Median age, DMA 0.008* 0.004 0.026* 0.013 0.035** 0.014 0.019** 0.011
Business density 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000
High school
education
attainment
0.041** 0.003 0.025* 0.011 0.033** 0.012 -0.016+ 0.010
Median hhl income 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000
Percent foreign
born
0.019** 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 -0.012** 0.004
Percent below
poverty level
0.055** 0.005 0.075** 0.015 0.053** 0.016 0.021 0.014
DMA dummies √ √ √ √
Month dummies √ √ √ √
R2 0.91 0.65 0.66 0.29
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 18: Effect of the Paywall on Online Newspaper Readership
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DV= ln(Ad Spend) % Ad Spend on
All Online
Newspapers in
the U.S.
ln(Ad Rate) ln(Impressions)
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Post 1.29** 0.09 0.03** 0.01 0.32** 0.02 0.97** 0.10 0.64** 0.12
Category
dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Month of the
year dummies
√ √ √ √ √
ln (page
views) 2.55** 0.42
ln (ad rate) 0.07 0.19
R2 0.55 0.53 0.77 0.60 0.62
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 19: Effect of the Paywall on Online Advertising
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DV= Weekday
circulation share
Weekend
circulation share
Est. SE Est. SE
NYT -0.907** 0.250 -0.422 0.352
Post -0.258** 0.026 -0.265** 0.024
NYT*Post 0.109* 0.054 0.144** 0.047
Political Leaning
Elections 2012
0.018 0.166 0.247 0.248
Median Age, DMA -0.025 0.034 -0.058 0.053
Business density 1.29** 0.577 2.26** 0.910
High school
Attainment 2012
0.056+ 0.029 0.058 0.044
Median hhl income 0.299 0.175 0.193 0.195
Pct foreign born 0.025** 0.009 0.021+ 0.012
Pct below poverty
level
0.055 0.032 0.082+ 0.044
R2 0.39 0.24
SEs clustered by DMA; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 20: Effect of the Paywall on Print Readership
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All DMAs, USA Today as control group
DV= Weekday circulation
share
Weekend circulation
share
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
NYT -1.083** 0.039 -0.922** 0.153 -0.356** 0.113 -0.223 0.489
Post -0.281** 0.029 -0.225** 0.041 -0.334** 0.037 -0.148** 0.056
NYT*Post 0.337** 0.034 0.102+ 0.052 0.523** 0.049 0.065 0.074
p[ -0.134** 0.013 -0.272** 0.055 -0.125** 0.013 -0.194** 0.065
Time trend
(NYT)
0.055** 0.010 0.129** 0.023
Time trend
(Control)
0.027 0.021 -0.026 0.026
DMA
dummies
√ √ √ √
R2 0.79 0.79 0.71 0.71
[: using instruments to resolve the endogeneity in price; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 21: Robustness checks - 1 - (Effect of paywall on print readership): Assessing the role
of alternate sampling strategies
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All DMAs, WSJ as control group
DV= Weekday circulation
share
Weekend circulation
share
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
NYT -0.799** 0.020 -1.033** 0.077 -0.136** 0.061 -0.583** 0.219
Post -0.198** 0.032 -0.129** 0.037 -0.144** 0.033 -0.073+ 0.042
NYT*Post 0.153** 0.036 0.099+ 0.051 0.181** 0.038 0.106+ 0.059
p[ -0.041** 0.009 0.039 0.029 -0.052** 0.008 0.000 0.030
Time trend
(NYT)
0.039** 0.013 0.022* 0.011
Time trend
(Control)
-0.064** 0.020 -0.048** 0.021
DMA
dummies
√ √ √ √
R2 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.69
[: using instruments to resolve the endogeneity in price; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 22: Robustness checks - 2 - (Effect of paywall on print readership): Using WSJ as the
control group
Print Circulation for each Newspaper
NYT
Weekend
NYT
Weekday
USAT
Weekend
USAT
Weekday
WSJ
Weekend
WSJ
Weekday
Pre 1,686,020 1,034,263 2,454,332 2,207,041 1,919,427 2,039,218
Post 1,419,153 766,656 1,856,428 1,661,160 1,491,028 1,551,209
Avg Annual
Decay Rate in
Pre Period
Circulation
-3.18% -4.19% -4.41% -3.47% -2.59% -1.59%
Table 23: Circulation trends for each newspaper
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Figure 9: Shifting balance away from reliance on advertising revenues
Figure 10: Growth in paid subscribers to NYT’s website
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Figure 11: Online newspaper visitation before and after launch of the paywall (NY Times
and USA Today)
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
To
ta
l A
d 
Im
pr
e
ss
io
n
s 
(m
illi
on
s)
1 13 25 37 49
Month
Total # Impressions Total Expenditure (right axis)
Avg Ad Rate (right axis)
Online Advertising - NY Times
To
ta
l A
d 
Ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 
($ 
m
illi
on
s);
 
Av
g 
Ad
 
Ra
te
 
(C
PM
)
Figure 12: Temporal Evolution of Online Ad Revenues, Rates and Ad Levels
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APPENDIX A
Readership Reweighting
Readership re-weighting to account for differential advertising contribution of the Week-
day/Sunday newspapers
We consider the case where the Sunday version of the newspaper contributes 50% of the
newspaper’s total advertising revenues (the industry benchmark). Let $ and s¨ denote the
per-reader advertising contribution of the Weekday and Sunday newspaper respectively. If
the Sunday edition is responsible for 50% of total advertising revenues, we have
(RDaily +RWknd +RSun)s¨
RDaily(6$ + s¨) +RWknd(2$ + s¨) +RSuns¨
= 12
This can be used to compute an expression for $/s¨, which can further be used to reweight
readership according to the expression: Rt = RDaily ∗ 6 ($/s¨ + 1) +RWknd ∗ 2($/s¨+ 1) +RSun
in the advertising demand model to account for the differential advertising contribution of
the Sunday newspaper.
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APPENDIX B
Does newspaper advertising influence subscription decisions?
To try to answer this question with our data, we estimated the readership model allowing
the levels of advertising (proxied by total advertising quantity) to influence consumer util-
ity. We found that its effect is negative, small and statistically insignificant (last column in
Table A.1). However, it is possible that readers’ subscription decisions may be influenced
differentially by the three advertising types: Display ads, Inserts, and Classifieds. To explore
this possibility we estimated alternative model specifications where we allowed the three ad-
vertising types to influence readers’ decisions individually.45 We found that the coefficients
on the advertising terms were insignificant in all cases. We found no difference in the result
based on whether or not we allowed the advertising effect to vary by bundle (Table A.2), or
allowed these coefficients to be heterogeneous.46 Further, as we described in the Estimation
section, in our empirical specification for readership demand, we specify year-fixed effects to
flexibly capture the temporal evolution of readers’ preferences. Therefore, the insignificant
effect of advertising on readership just suggests that the within year variation in advertising
might not have an effect on readership. A concern is that these year fixed effects may also
be capturing the significant influence of year-on-year changes in advertising on subscription
decisions. To assess the validity of this concern, we also estimated alternative model spec-
ifications for readership demand with advertising included as a covariate, but without year
fixed effects. We found that the advertising coefficients were statistically insignificant even
after excluding the year fixed effects. We provide these results in Table A.2. This helps us
place more faith in our assumption that newspaper subscription decisions are not influenced
by advertising levels.
45Given the high temporal correlation (0.55-0.85) between the three types of advertising, we could not
estimate a model that allowed for the simultaneous influence of all three advertising quantities.
46These results can be obtained from the authors on request.
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Does advertising influence readers’ subscription decisions?
Parameter ROP PPT CLAS Total Ad-
vertising
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Pref (M-Thurs) 2.30*** 0.26 2.28** 0.25 2.29** 0.26 2.29** 0.26
Pref (Fri,Sat) -1.77*** 0.12 -1.77** 0.11 -1.77** 0.12 -1.77** 0.12
Pref (Sun) -6.67*** 0.50 -6.68** 0.50 -6.76** 0.56 -6.67** 0.50
NDM price -0.05* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02
ONDM price -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01
# of news pgs 0.44** 0.16 0.45** 0.15 0.45** 0.15 0.45** 0.15
C1-Income 0.64** 0.07 0.64** 0.07 0.64** 0.07 8.98** 0.07
C2-Income 0.46** 0.08 0.46** 0.08 0.46** 0.08 5.58** 0.08
C3-Income 0.29** 0.09 0.29** 0.09 0.29** 0.09 3.36** 0.09
C4-Income 0.58** 0.08 0.58** 0.08 0.58** 0.08 7.73** 0.08
C5-Income 0.13+ 0.08 0.13+ 0.08 0.13+ 0.08 1.61** 0.08
NDM Y2007 -0.30** 0.06 -0.30** 0.06 -0.29** 0.06 -0.30** 0.06
NDM Y2008 -0.48** 0.08 -0.48** 0.07 -0.45** 0.11 -0.48** 0.07
NDM Y2009 -0.16+ 0.09 -0.16* 0.07 -0.12 0.12 -0.17* 0.08
NDM Y2010 -0.16 0.10 -0.16* 0.08 -0.11 0.12 -0.17+ 0.09
NDM Y2011 -0.29* 0.11 -0.29** 0.08 -0.23+ 0.14 -0.29** 0.10
ONDM Y2007 -0.17** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05
ONDM Y2008 -0.30** 0.07 -0.30** 0.06 -0.27** 0.10 -0.30** 0.07
ONDM Y2009 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.07
ONDM Y2010 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.08
ONDM Y2011 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.09
ROP
Advertising
-0.03 0.14
PPT
Advertising
-0.05 0.10
CLAS
Advertising
0.64 2.02
Total
Advertising
-0.21 0.59
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table A.1: Appendix - Alternative specifications for the readership model (1)
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Allowing
for different
effects of
advertising
for Daily,
Weekend
and Sunday
bundles
Effect of advertising excluding year dummies
and demographic controls
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Pref (M-Thurs) 0.63 1.29 0.62 1.03 0.54 1.03 0.64 1.01 0.59 1.03
Pref (Fri,Sat) -2.72** 0.64 -2.52** 0.47 -2.56** 0.47 -2.50** 0.46 -2.54** 0.47
Pref (Sun) -6.01** 1.22 -5.77** 0.90 -5.72** 0.90 -5.95** 0.94 -5.74** 0.90
NDM price 0.18* 0.06 0.16** 0.05 0.16** 0.05 0.17** 0.06 0.16** 0.05
ONDM price 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05
# of news pgs 1.50 0.98 1.42* 0.64 1.48** 0.64 1.37* 0.62 1.45** 0.64
ROP Advertising -0.10 0.32
PPT Advertising -0.27 0.37
CLAS Advertising 1.16 2.71
Total Advertising -0.81 1.72
Total
Advertising-Daily
-0.82 7.75
Total Advertising-
Weekend
2.51 3.87
Total Advertising-
Sunday
-0.06 3.19
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table A.2: Appendix - Alternative specifications for the readership model (2)
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